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Executive summary  
 
Asset managers' and fund managers’ role in preserving biodiversity and natural capital 
On their websites and in interviews, asset managers and fund managers indicate that they take the 
impact and dependencies of investee companies with regard to biodiversity and natural capital (BNC) 
into account. We are interested in finding out in which way and to which extent they do so, and we 
thereby specifically focus on the BNC-related issues of climate, water, land use and chemicals. The 
reason is that in this way, asset managers and fund managers may contribute to the worldwide 
public goal of BNC preservation as among others included in the UN Sustainable Development Goals.  
This study is a qualitative study. After finishing the literature research, we conducted multiple semi-
structured interviews with mostly Dutch as well as a few foreign asset managers and fund managers, 
and with some key Netherlands-based large investee companies. The goal was to examine how BNC 
plays a role in the investment strategy of asset managers and fund managers and how they engage 
with investee companies, i.e. do they prompt their investee companies to improve their BNC 
performance? On the basis of the research findings, we analysed in which way public policy makers 
can enable asset managers and fund managers on the one hand and investee companies on the 
other hand to improve the quality of the information on the BNC performance of investee 
companies. The research findings as well as the recommendations based thereon were tested in two 
expert meetings, one with Dutch experts and the second one with experts from multiple countries. 
In this study, we particularly investigate in which way the EU Directive 2014/95 on mandatory non-
financial reporting, and its predecessors, can be helpful (1) for the specific needs of asset managers 
and fund managers in terms of taking BNC-information into account in their investment decisions 
and engagement practices and (2) for reporting companies in collecting and organising their BNC-
information. In order to assess this question, we first need to understand the role of asset managers 
and fund managers in the process of engagement with company and in which way they can exert 
influence. This is what we refer to as the 'external feedback loop' in the Theory of Change. 
Investors increasingly take BNC into consideration 
Our research results reveal that asset managers and fund managers are indeed interested in 
information on investee companies' BNC performance. However, it became clear that, for various 
reasons, in particular carbon emissions draw the attention of investors. The other three concepts, 
water use, land use, and chemical pollution, hardly played a role in designing investment policies and 
in the financial analysis of companies. These three aspects are looked at by investors mainly on an ad 
hoc basis whenever problems or issues are expected or occurring, and then they can become part of 
the engagement process. 
Few investors whom we had interviewed indicated that they use investee companies' BNC 
information in their regular financial analyses of the companies' business case. Environmental Social 
and Governance (ESG) aspects of companies' performance are overall still predominantly evaluated 
by the sustainability departments of asset managers and investment managers, and problems in 
these area's usually first lead to engagement rather than to disinvestment although that could 
ultimately be the investor's decision. 
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Yet, more can and should be done 
As BNC is not yet fully integrated in financial profit and risk analyses nor in the investment decision 
procedures and strategy, we tried to find out which obstacles are currently hindering this and how 
obstacles could be addressed. We note that the materiality of BNC is in the process of becoming 
understood by investors, and that the materiality of carbon emissions for corporate financial 
performance is increasingly acknowledged by the selected investors. 
The main impediment to integrating BNC-related data in the investment strategy and trading process 
is the lack of reliable and comparable data on investee company and sector level. The interviewed 
investors indicated that whilst there is still much to be gained if more companies would adopt 
current reporting formats (integrated reporting, GRI and others), these reporting formats are not 
aligned with each other, and thus the results cannot be easily compared. Investors often take 
decisions on the basis of rankings and in order to compose a clear ranking of corporate performance 
on BNC, all investee companies should report in the same way on the same topics and in according 
with the same reporting formats. Moreover, it is crucial that the information is true and correct, thus 
independently verified. Still, even in the existing methodologies, gaps exist in the ways of measuring 
data, which cause problems in fully assessing investee companies' BNC-related impacts and 
dependencies. Even in regard of companies' reporting on carbon emissions, there are large 
variations, e.g. re scope 3 information. 
Engagement helps, but could be better 
The companies which we interviewed indicated that discussions with investors do have an impact on 
a company’s strategy, ambitions and thereby performance in the long run. Engagement makes it 
easier for internal supporters of BNC to put BNC issues ‘on the agenda’ and/or helps them to get 
their agenda implemented.  However, the companies interviewed complained that whenever an 
engagement takes place in regard of their BNC performance, the focus of investors is mostly on the 
negative corporate impact on BNC while they do not seem to value any positive impacts on BNC 
established by these companies.  
Some of the interviewed investors acknowledged that they do not regard BNC as a central issue, but 
added that they do include BNC in their engagement strategies. The lowest relative amount of BNC 
engagements amongst the interviewed investors was 6%. Conversely, sometimes BNC themes form 
the primary focus of an investor.  
Need for more in-depth engagement and standardised data gathering 
Companies indicate a need for a more in-depth conversation on BNC. A more productive form of 
engagement may be so-called ‘firelight sessions’ (i.e. strategic sessions with the board of directors or 
management board about a company’s strategy and ambitions). In such strategic sessions, views on 
developments and trends in the sector could be exchanged. The interviewed companies expect that 
such an approach can contribute more effectively to improving their company's BNC strategy and 
profile than the current engagement approach consisting of an issue-based ad hoc approach. 
The interviewed companies would also welcome uniform standards for measurement and reporting 
as they currently have to spend much time responding to ESG rating agencies' questionnaires, which 
often ask for similar information, while each questionnaire diverges in indicators and methodology.  
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Recommendation 1: Standardisation of BNC reporting methodologies  
In reporting on BNC there is the need to strike the right balance between stimulating reporting along 
common standards (standardisation) and leaving room for different approaches as the relevant BNC 
impacts and dependencies vary among companies and sectors.  
Require standardised reporting  
The common opinion of investors and companies is that BNC measuring and reporting 
methodologies are currently well enough developed to be used.  
Generally, the asset managers and fund managers stated that they do not see a responsibility or role 
for themselves in imposing a certain methodology on their investee companies. They see this as a 
matter for companies among themselves to select a common approach, i.e. per BNC-theme and 
maybe also a sector-based approach. The interviewed persons also indicated the relevance of 
revealing the geographical location of production sites when reporting on BNC impacts and 
dependencies in order to create a better understanding of and insight in operational risks and 
opportunities. Such a reporting aspect can be supplemented by satellite data and may for instance 
help to establish the exact water use of a production site and possible land degradation issues in 
their vicinity. 
The EU Directive, and/or the domestic implementation legislation, can assist in improving the 
uniformity and reliability of BNC reporting by making more explicit reference to such standard 
reporting methodologies, e.g. by imposing on companies to report in accordance with the GRI BNC 
guidelines.  
Stimulate experimentation and methodological development 
In regard of BNC issues, concerning which measurement and reporting methodologies are not that 
well developed, e.g. the use of the soil in agricultural practices - which is linked to the use of 
chemicals - it was recommended by the interviewees to start with a principle-based framework, 
celebrate best practices and start monitoring. Thus, a learning process and communities of practice 
need to be put into place. Governments can continue to fund the development and selection of 
appropriate methodologies and to stimulate their uptake. The selected methodologies should 
become part of the education of among others accountants and finance professionals, and 
environmental experts and lawyers. The government can also play a role in directing this. 
Standardise the data gathering process 
Standardisation of BNC reporting formats will also help to lower the costs of data gathering on the 
side of companies. Now every ESG rating agency has its own detailed questionnaire. A more 
standardised data gathering process not only lowers corporate costs, it also makes it possible to 
compare the findings. 
Recommendation 2: Incentives for asset managers and fund managers to use BNC data in financial 
analysis 
Public policies to protect BNC 
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Firstly, governments themselves play an important role in translating BNC impact and dependencies 
into corporate costs and benefits through for instance their regulation and taxation. Public policy 
makers can make the financial sector receptive for BNC accounting and reporting through signalling 
that they (will) maintain credible policies to protect BNC. Governments can also increase the number 
of investable projects with a positive BNC impact, for instance through public co-investments, 
procurement and by stimulating the green bond market. 
Strengthen the evidence base of the materiality of BNC 
Another way to increase the perceived benefit for financial institutions of BNC accounting and 
reporting is through building the evidence base on the materiality of BNC for financial institutions. 
Much research has been done on the financial risks and returns of ESG performance. However, 
specifically on BNC more research is needed. More BNC research may provide more insights into the 
financial materiality of the issue. For instance, scenarios could be developed similar to the scenarios 
developed for the carbon bubble.  Scenarios could start from the assumption that internationally 
agreed goals with regard to BNC preservation (biodiversity, water etc.) will be met. The scenarios 
could then show how these internationally agreed goals can be met and how meeting these goals 
will impact specific sectors, geographical locations, companies and asset classes. 
Supervision of BNC risks  
Supervisors and regulators, like the Dutch Central Bank and Financial Markets Authority, are 
important players in the Dutch financial market. They see to it that financial institutions conduct 
proper assessments of all material risks – also the ones originating from BNC impact and 
dependencies. When such instructions become more strict, financial institutions are incentivised to 
pay closer attention to BNC.  
Stimulate long-term investing 
Lastly, there is the wider issue of reform of the financial sector. The financial sector should focus 
more on the real economy and the long term, as this will make this sector more aware of BNC 
impacts and dependencies. Several proposals have been brought forward to make banks and asset 
managers more forward-looking and more conducive to ecological issues. A more forward-looking 
approach can be stimulated by for instance establishing performance criteria and fees with a long-
term perspective for asset managers, quarterly reporting by asset managers instead of the current 
daily, weekly or monthly reporting and by paying more attention to qualitative information (strategy 
of the organisation, goals set, processes) and their BNC performance.  
  
  9 
1. Introduction 
1.1 The financial feedback loop  
Over the last two decades, reporting on Environmental, Social and Governance issues (ESG), part of 
the ‘non-financial’ reporting, has developed strongly, aided by a multitude of regulations, guidelines 
and initiatives that express the need for corporate transparency in these fields (García-Sánchez et al., 
2013; Maas and Vermeulen, 2016; Lambooy 2010a; Lambooy and Kamp-Roelands 2007; Lambooy, 
Diepeveen, Van 't Foort 2015). Various stakeholders, including governments, have high expectations 
of the potential impact of reporting leading to improved transparency and accountability (Hahn and 
Kühnen, 2013) in addition to change in the behavior and performance of companies (Adams and 
McNicholas, 2007).  
Maas and Vermeulen (2016) provide a systemic overview of the potential effects of non-financial 
reporting. This systemic overview shows how non-financial reporting is expected to result in 
companies’ performance improvement. It shows that this theory of change behind efforts to 
stimulate and mandate non-financial reporting assumes multiple feedback loops.  An important part 
of these expected effects depends on the feedback loops running from the users of the reports to 
the reporting companies. One of these feedback loops runs between investors and investee 
companies through responsible investment strategies. However, the effects of this feedback loop 
were largely built upon expectations and assumptions, as the evidence base is almost non-existent.  
This research aims to start filling this gap. We have analysed whether and how engagement 
strategies – a part of responsible investment strategies – used by investors - asset managers and 
fund managers - leads to better reporting and company performance improvement  with regard to 
biodiversity and natural capital (BNC).  
Looking at the financial sector as an ‘agent of change’ in the field of biodiversity preservation is in 
line with another strand of research by the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL). 
PBL has suggested that if governments aim to achieve their stated ambitions on conservation and 
sustainable use of global biodiversity, there are alternative, parallel methods to strengthening 
intergovernmental cooperation. For example, global biodiversity governance can take a more 
pragmatic approach aiming at strengthening new non-governmental agents of change (Hajer, 2011). 
Financial institutions can be such agents of change, using their leverage towards investee companies 
that impact BNC and/or are dependent on BNC (Van Tilburg and Achterberg, 2016, Lambooy 2010b).  
Gaining a more tangible insight into the role of the financial sector as a driver of the external 
feedback loop for company reporting and performance also helps to identify opportunities for the 
development of supporting or synergetic government policies (Maas and Vermeulen 2016, Van 
Tilburg and Achterberg 2016). In this regard a particularly important recent development is the 
implementation of the EU Directive on non-financial reporting (2014/95),1 which had to be 
effectuated by 1 January 2017. This Directive aims to encourage an increase in information flows 
from companies to their shareholders (and other stakeholders) about also their BNC impact and 
dependencies.  
                                                             
1 See at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0095&from=en. 
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1.2 Research objective, scope and questions 
The main objective of this research is to see how public policy makers can enable asset and fund 
managers to prompt their investee companies to improve their BNC performance. In particular, how 
the EU Directive 2014/95 on mandatory non-financial reporting can be helpful for the specific needs 
of asset managers and fund managers.  
In order to do this, we need to understand the role of asset managers and fund managers in the 
functioning and impact of the external feedback loop on the efforts of Dutch stock exchange listed 
companies. This also includes other companies that fall under the intended target group of the EU 
Directive 2014/95. 
Within the financial sector we focus on the stockholders as these are, through their equity holdings, 
the owners of the companies that have an impact on BNC. Legally the asset owners (like pension 
funds, insurance companies and retail investors) are the real owners of the stocks and thus 
companies. In this research we focus instead on the asset managers and fund managers that asset 
owners hire to manage their holdings of stocks. It is these asset managers and fund managers who 
eventually decide on the buying and selling of stocks and who do most of the engagement with the 
companies. Although always based on some form of contract with the asset owners that defines 
their mandate. The asset managers and fund managers therefore have both a responsibility and the 
power to prompt their investee companies to improve their BNC performance.  
It is the stockholders who also run the biggest financial risk when companies get into trouble, for 
instance due to their exposure to carbon (Weyzig et al. 2014) and thus have the strongest financial 
incentive to manage the BNC impact and dependency.  
Unlike banks, asset managers and fund managers also have to rely on publicly available data, which 
makes the EU Directive 2014/95 most relevant for them.  
Of the different assets through which asset managers and fund managers are connected to their 
investee companies we will focus on the holding of equity shares or stocks. As it is these assets that 
make them the (part) owner of a company, as opposed to bonds or other lending that is a financial 
agreement between two separate organisations.  
Within the realm of BNC we focus on the aspects of land use, water use, chemical pollution and 
carbon emissions as these cover the most important BNC impacts and dependencies and hence they 
already receive most attention from asset managers and fund managers.   
The following research questions will be answered: 
With regard to the asset managers and fund managers: 
1. To what extent and how is information on land use, water use, chemical pollution and 
carbon emissions presently used in investment decisions and engagement with investee 
companies? Is BNC assessment already a special area of interest, related to the risk 
assessment?  
2. What BNC aspects are regarded most essential for investment decisions? Or is BNC 
information used on aggregate levels only, based on general ESG-ratings and -benchmarks? 
  11 
3. How do asset managers and fund managers decide on applying a certain action in the event a 
company’s activities negatively impact BNC (e.g. exclusion of worst offenders, inclusion of 
frontrunners, and/or engagement with companies and funds)?  
4. If BNC information is not used for investment decisions: why not, and what has to change so 
that this information will be taken into account? 
With regard to the companies: 
5. Is interaction with asset managers and fund managers an important motivation for 
companies to change their reporting on BNC impacts and dependencies?  
6. Is interaction with asset managers and fund managers an important motivation for 
companies to change their performance of BNC impacts and dependencies? 
7. What are the expected effects on company reporting and performance of the different types 
of interventions by investors? 
1.3 Research methodology 
The study is based on desk research, ten interviews with asset managers and fund managers, four 
interviews with companies listed at the Euronext and two validation workshops.  
A literature study, including academic literature and 'grey' literature, was conducted to collect 
existing research data and insights related to (a) the potential theories of change behind 
interventions of asset managers and fund managers (RQ 1, 2, 3 and 4), (b) effects and impact of these 
interventions on companies (focussing on strategy, internal processes, corporate governance, 
performance and reporting) (RQ 5, 6 and 7).  
The interviews provided extra input for our results. Semi-structured interviews were used to test 
theory, to collect new and practical information, and to adapt our theoretical frameworks (the legal 
framework of EU Directive 2014/95 and the Theory of Change, ToC). By specifying how asset 
managers and fund managers and companies are influenced by each other, we reduce the potential 
bias included in the answers.  
We interviewed four companies, DSM, AkzoNobel, Corbion, and Heijmans, that have a large impact 
on BNC. As regards the asset managers and fund managers, we have also tried to find a mix of 
managers along the whole spectrum of large and small, Dutch and foreign owned (and active) asset 
managers, and asset managers with proprietary funds (insurance companies), funds of institutional 
investors and retail clients. We have interviewed ACTIAM, Aegon, BlackRock, BMO Global Asset 
Management (BMO), MN, NN Investment Partners (NNIP), PGGM, Robeco, SPF Beheer and Triodos 
Investment Management (Triodos IM).   
Based on the results, recommendations for government regulations on BNC reporting and supportive 
policies are drafted.  
1.4 Outline of this report 
This report is structured as follows. Chapter two starts with defining the concepts of BNC and how 
they are relevant for companies and investors and then describes the ToC and explains how the ToC 
is relevant for investee companies and their investors and how investors, through their engagement, 
try to improve the performance of their investee companies. Chapter three describes the legal 
framework on reporting. Chapter four provides an overview of the current state of affairs of BNC 
  12 
data transparency and use of these data by asset managers and fund managers based on existing 
literature. Chapter five describes the outcomes of the interviews with the asset managers and 
companies. Chapter six draws conclusions by relating the findings of investors and companies to each 
other and to the literature. Based on our findings, we formulate policy recommendations and 
questions for further research.  
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2. Theoretical framework  
This chapter describes our theoretical framework. It starts with defining the concepts of BNC and 
how they are relevant for companies and investors. We then look how asset managers and fund 
managers, through their engagement, try to improve the performance of their investee companies in 
the field of BNC (i.e. the ToC). This ToC describes the expected change behind interventions of asset 
managers and fund managers, the effects and impact of these interventions on Dutch listed 
companies (focusing on strategy, internal processes, corporate governance, performance and 
reporting)  and the potential role of the present EU Directive 2014/95 and supporting policies. 
2.1 BNC  
In economic terms, the concept of capital refers to a stock that is used to produce wealth. The term 
historically (Smith, 1776) refers to financial and manufactured capital, e.g. money and machines. It 
was after the economic growth years following WWII, when the environmental degradation as a 
result of economic activities became a societal concern, that the concept of natural capital was 
coined (Schumacher, 1970). 
Natural capital can be defined as “the stock of renewable and non-renewable natural resources (e.g. 
plants, animals, air, water, soils, minerals) that combine to yield a flow of benefits to people” 
(Natural Capital Coalition, 2016, p. 12). The value of natural capital can be measured through the 
goods and services it provides. These (ecosystem) goods and services are defined as the 
contributions that ecosystems make to human well-being (EEA, 2011). Biodiversity is an essential 
part of natural capital and is defined as “the variability among living organisms from all sources 
(terrestrial, marine)” (Vos, Grashof-Bokdam and Opdam, 2014, p 18).  
BNC is the fundament of human wellbeing and the economy. Whereas its ecological services can be 
enjoyed freely and some of the natural capital stock can be used as it has a certain capacity for 
regeneration, there are clear limits to its usage. Limits that are increasingly surpassed. The 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment2 found that human actions are depleting the natural capital, 
putting such strain on the environment that the ability of the planet’s ecosystems to sustain future 
generations can no longer be taken for granted. The five largest pressure factors on biodiversity are 
land conversion, climate change, the introduction of exotic and invasive species, overexploitation 
(including the use of water) and pollution (including chemicals) (PBL, 2014). In this research, we focus 
on the main pressures that cause loss of BNC: carbon emissions, land use, water and chemicals.  
2.2 Economic and financial relevance of BNC 
2.2.1 Economic costs of BNC depletion 
A clear relationship exists between companies and BNC. On the one hand, companies may affect BNC 
with their economic activities, for instance through land conversion or pollution of the environment. 
On the other hand, companies depend on BNC as production factors or inputs into production, such 
as wood, food, water, land or clean air. Due to companies’ dependence on BNC, BNC degradation 
may pose significant business risks (Lambooy 2010b).  
 
                                                             
2
 The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) is a major assessment of the human impact on the 
environment, called for by the United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2000, launched in 2001. 
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The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) has monetised the loss of BNC at US$2–4.5 
trillion per year (TEEB, 2010). A study by Trucost found that economic activities are estimated to 
generate US$7.3 trillion in external environmental costs per year or 13% of global Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) (Trucost, 2013). Another estimate of the average annual economic cost of human-
induced environmental degradation was US$6.6 trillion, equivalent to 11% of global GDP (UNEP FI 
2011).  
Being in the double digits, as a percentage of GDP, these highly variable numbers certainly are 
material. As a percentage of the company profit they are even substantially higher in most sectors. In 
2010, the cost of environmental damage caused by 11 key industry sectors was equivalent to 41% 
(KPMG, 2012) to over half (UNEP FI, 2011) of their pre-tax profits (see Figure 1). Some sectors, such 
as food producers, would have no profits left if they had to pay the full cost of 
repairing/compensating for their negative environmental externalities (KPMG, 2012).  
Figure 1 Negative environmental externalities (in US$ billion and percentage of EBITDA), 2010 
 
 Source: KPMG (2012) 
2.2.2 BNC impact and dependency of the financial sector 
Figure 2 shows the different relations between suppliers and recipients of funds in the financial 
sector. These suppliers and recipients can find each other directly (e.g. through private placements or 
crowdfunding), but most of the funds are intermediated by either insurance companies and pension 
funds, asset and fund managers and banks. Insurance companies and pension funds can let asset and 
fund managers intermediate on their behalf, or invest themselves in banks as well.  
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Figure 2 Position of asset managers and fund managers within the financial sector 
 
 
There are several (interlinked) ways through which the BNC performance of companies influence the 
(financial) performance of asset managers, fund managers and asset owners (see Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3 Linking ecosystem impacts with financial institution risks 
 
Source: NCD (2013) 
The six main ways in which BNC management of investee companies can be(come) a material issue 
for asset managers and fund managers are through (UNEP FI 2008, NCD 2013, VBDO and CREM 
2015): 
- Reputational risks. As retail customers, business clients and funders may withdraw from 
doing business with an investee company as a result of BNC costs caused by such company 
that are deemed excessive; 
- Credit- and investment risks. Losses at investee companies due to disrupted business 
operations caused by failing but essential ecosystem services that companies depend upon 
or the inaccessibility of crucial input (like virgin raw materials). Or as governments stop giving 
permits and concessions or end existing ones; 
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-  
 Box 1 BNC related risks for palm oil producers 
In a series of reports, Chain Reaction Research (CRR), a collaborative effort of AidEnvironment, Profundo and 
Climate Advisers, analysed how different listed palm oil companies are exposed to risks related to BNC impact 
and dependencies. In February 2016, CRR published a report predicting that the Round Table on Sustainable 
Palm Oil (RSPO) could suspend IOI Corporation from Malaysia due to the clearing of forests. When the RSPO 
did suspend IOI soon after, the company started losing purchases from 20 major customers such as Unilever, 
Nestlé and Kellogg’s. IOI’s share price fell 17.6%, while Moody’s reviewed its debt for a downgrade. Losing 
major buyers is one clear risk. Another risk is the loss of concession areas, which can be developed into new 
plantations (the ‘landbank’) as governments increasingly protect their BNC. Indonesia recently announced a 
moratorium on new plantation developments (van Gelder 2016).  
- Credit- and investment opportunities. Companies can also profit from the challenges of BNC 
preservation by providing solutions. Financial institutions may also themselves profit from 
new products inspired by nature (biomimicry) and the preservation of BNC like the growing 
green bond market and the market for responsible asset management. Preservation of BNC 
makes companies less dependent on BNC sources; 
- Legal liability risks. These risks  may become apparent as national laws, banking regulations 
and reporting requirements become more demanding and increasingly seek to require 
companies to include non-financial issues in corporate strategies and reporting. This liability 
may extend to financial institutions. Thus, not pro-actively raising ESG issues presents a very 
real risk to be sued for negligence (UNEP FI 2009); 
- Market and systemic risks. Whereas an individual financial institution can adapt its portfolio 
according to the risks and opportunities it anticipates, not all BNC risks can be hedged in this 
way (CISL 2015); and 
- Regulatory risks. Regulations’ pace of introduction is likely to quicken and tighten, such as for 
combating climate change (see box below on the ‘carbon bubble’), clean oceans or clean air, 
creating risks and opportunities.  
 
Box 2 Case of carbon bubble 
Insurance companies in particular have been aware of the physical risks that climate change poses to their 
business model. As  the average global temperature increases, the frequency and intensity and therefore 
impact  of hurricanes, flooding and wildfires will increase. However, there is also a financial risk if the global 
community succeeds in limiting climate change to the 1.5-2 degrees, as many financial assets derive their value 
from operations that are not compatible with the remaining carbon budget, for which countries have made 
pledges that are laid down in national regulation. For instance, estimates are that only 20-40% of all known 
fossil fuel reserves actually can be burned in the future due to climate change. This will reduce the value and 
creditworthiness of many companies engaged in that business (Carbon Tracker Initiative 2011). In this carbon 
bubble scenario, equity owners (e.g. pension funds, insurance companies) will be particularly hard hit, but also 
lenders (e.g. banks) will suffer because the percentage of non-performing loans will rise (Weyzig et al, 2014).  
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2.3 Shareholder engagement – explanation of the ToC  
2.3.1 Responsible investment and engagement 
As shown in the previous section, asset managers and fund managers are exposed to the potential 
risks that flow from BNC, through their ties with their investee companies. In order to mitigate these 
risks, asset managers and fund managers have several strategies that they can execute.  
Basically, the following six investment strategies are all ways of deciding whether asset managers 
should hold more or less of a specific asset as a result of taking specific BNC issues into account. The 
UN PRI distinguishes six responsible investment strategies (UN PRI, 2016): 
1. ESG negative/exclusionary screening; 
2. Norms-based screening; 
3. ESG positive screening and best-in-class;  
4. ESG themed investments; 
5. Integration of ESG issues; and 
6. Engagement. 
Strategies 1-4 present the most binary choice: whether to include or exclude a certain asset, like the 
stock or a bond of a certain company, from the investment universe. For instance, defining certain 
norms (like no involvement in controversies around basic human rights or no involvement in the 
production of cluster ammunition) and simply not investing in any companies that cross these red 
lines. This is also called norms-based screening.  
The related but opposite strategy is to only invest in companies that score the best, either on an 
absolute measure (like providing solutions to climate change or water shortages) or on a relative one 
(belonging to the 10% lowest carbon emitters in the sector). 
Another strategy is to integrate ESG in the regular investment process, using ESG data alongside the 
traditional financial data in valuing a company’s stock. The decision to (dis)invest in a company is 
then taken on the basis of this valuation in relation to the company’s stock price and risk profile. 
Here, the result is not so much an in- or exclusion, but a decision to (further) overweigh or 
underweigh the holdings of a certain asset, e.g. to hold more or less assets of a certain company than 
the market average (benchmark). 
The last strategy the PRI distinguishes is engagement. Whereas all the previous strategies can be 
defined as exit (and entrance) strategies, i.e. executed through buying or selling off the stock of a 
company, with engagement the investor interacts through its ‘voice’, through engaging in a 
conversation with the investee company.    
The broadest definition of shareholder engagement available is “the use of one’s ownership position 
to influence company management decision making” (Clark and Hebb, 2004, p. 144). These authors 
propose a more concise description of its goals and practices, and describe the goals as the aim to 
“increase transparency and accountability and to raise social and environmental standards of 
corporate behaviour” (2004, p. 164). These goals can be sought simultaneously within engagement. 
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Current literature mainly describes engagement approaches and activities, while information on the 
results of engagement is limited.  
It is important to bear in mind that engagement is often connected to the other responsible 
investment strategies. First, engagement can be started because a company is suspected of breaking 
or approaching certain pre-defined thresholds and thus risks being excluded. The result of an 
unsuccessful engagement can then be exclusion. Secondly, engagement can also be initiated before a 
decision is taken to include the company in a positive (thematic) fund. Successful engagement may 
then result in inclusion. Thirdly, engagement can be undertaken as a result of the analysis for ESG 
integration, when it is found that the company is an outlier on one or more ESG themes. Engagement 
can then create value if the investee company improves its performance in this particular field. 
If the company proves to be very unresponsive to the requests made by the investor, this may signal 
further ESG-problems, which may even lead to the exclusion of the company from the fund. Thus 
engagement can be a source of information for the other responsible investment strategies as well. 
2.3.2 The role of investor engagement in improving corporate BNC performance  
Based on available literature, we have analysed what the expectations are of academics and 
practitioners of engagement. Based on this information, we have drafted a system diagram of the 
ToC (Figure 4).  
A ToC runs from input to impact. This causal chain, also referred to as the ‘impact value chain’, 
distinguishes between the resources used for an action (input); the action itself (also referred to as 
project, activity, intervention or program); the immediate quantitative synthesis of the action 
(output); the direct changes in people, organisations, natural and physical environments, and social 
systems and institutions (outcome); along with highest order effects of the action (impact) (Clark, et 
al., 2004; Liket et al., 2014). Systematically depicting the ToC concerning engagement requires 
information on the process of engagement. Being explicit about the ToC behind engagement helps to 
get better insights in the results and effectiveness and to identify opportunities for improvement and 
design accompanying policies. The ToC on engagement will be used as one of our theoretical 
frameworks to analyse, based on the interviews, if the expected processes and results actually take 
place in practice.  
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Figure 4 ToC concerning engagement  
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2.3.3 Motivations 
In shareholder engagement, asset managers and fund managers combine formal shareholder rights 
(see 3.2.2) with more informal forms of communication in order to influence investee companies 
(Logsdon and van Buren, 2009). Investors, such as pension funds, Socially Responsible investment 
(SRI) funds, other asset managers and fund managers, and individuals (Michelon and Rodrigue, 
2015), could decide to engage based on different reasons. Socially responsible investors can decide 
to engage because of idealistic motives (O’Rourke, 2003; Goodman et al., 2014; Haigh & Hazelton, 
2004). Investors can have interest-based motives or identity-based motives (Sjöström, 2008). 
Moreover, despite the fact that legislation only provides limited direct encouragement to private 
engagement behaviour (Yamahaki and Frynas, 2016), regulatory changes (Cowton, 2004) and 
bureaucratic and political incentives (Kolstad, 2016) also stimulates shareholder engagement. 
According to Kolstad (2016, p. 46), a possible reason for this move to engagement is that in 
increasing extent, the “institutional investors may have something to do with bureaucratic incentives 
among their staff, or, as in the case of sovereign wealth funds like the Norwegian Government 
Pension Fund Global, with political disincentives to use exclusion as a main approach to responsible 
investment”. Furthermore, creating dissonance (Ferraro and Beunza, 2014), changing social pressure 
(Clark & Hebb, 2004), publicity seeking (Logsdon and Van Buren, 2009), legitimacy building (Gifford, 
2012; Allen et al., 2012), external pressure (Ferraro & Beunza, 2014) and financial reasons (Clark and 
Hebb, 2004, Dimson, Karakaş & Li 2015, Barber 2006; Becht et al. 2010), can also be seen as drivers 
for shareholder engagement. 
 
With an engagement strategy, asset managers and fund managers aim to increase transparency and 
accountability, and want to raise social and environmental standards of corporate performance 
(Clark and Hebb, 2004; Ivanova, 2016). In quantitative studies (Annex provides more information 
about the hypotheses, methods and outcomes of these quantitative studies), effects have been 
found in the form of increased transparency (Reid and Toffel, 2009), higher corporate environmental 
performance (Lee and Lounsbury, 2011) and better performance on ESG issues (Vasi and King, 2012). 
In qualitative studies, impacts are defined in different terms. O’Rourke talks about “changing a 
company’s thought, rhetoric and behaviour toward a particular issue” (2003, p. 234). Logsdon and 
van Buren (2009) describe the effect of shareholder engagement as changing the priorities of 
company responses. Ferraro and Beunza (2014) observed how companies changed their positions, 
policies and actions in favour of a different political standpoint. They see the effect of shareholder 
engagement as one of shaping corporate debate. Moreover, a positive effect of shareholder 
engagement is also found on operating performance, stock market response, stock market 
performance (Dimson, Karakaş & Li 2015) and on financial results (Barber 2006; Becht et al. 2010). 
Becht et al. (2010) estimated that above average returns are largely associated with engagements 
rather than stock picking. Based on an empirical study of the 1993 and 1998 Fortune 500 companies 
that tested hypotheses on the relationships between institutional ownership and Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP), it is also argued that long-term ownership is positively correlated with CSP 
(Neubaum and Zhara, 2006). Moreover, looking at the literature of financial impacts of Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR), some scholars argue that it is unlikely that social activism will negatively 
affect financial performance (e.g. McLaren, 2004; Margolish and Walsh, 2001), or only in the short 
term, i.e. less than five till seven years (Eccles et al., 2012). Instead, it is argued that it may deliver 
financial gains (Cook and Deakin; 1999; Margolish and Walsh, 2001).   
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Research also shows contradictory effects of shareholder engagement. For example, Barber (2006) 
concluded that positive effects can be found on financial results of his targeted companies. However, 
he argued that institutional activism is a double-edged sword: “When prudently applied, shareholder 
activism can provide effective monitoring of publicly traded corporations. When abused, portfolio 
managers can pursue social activism to advance their personal agendas at the expense of those 
whose money they manage” (Barber, 2006 p. 18). Consequently, in this scenario social activism does 
not lead to shareholder value. Negative effects are found by David et al. (2007), who argued that 
engagement reduced even the CSP of investee companies. They infer that, rather than pressuring 
companies to improve CSP, activism may divert resources away from CSP to adverse political 
activities used by managers to resist external pressures and retain discretion. Hoepner et al. (2015) 
found a negative relation between ESG shareholder activism and corporate risk performance. They 
concluded that this may help the management and the board of the investee companies to develop a 
responsive plan and encourage a constructive dialogue (in the ToC implemented as the feedback 
loop). 
2.3.4 Engagement practices 
So we have seen that shareholder engagement does impact investee companies. Existing research 
mainly focusses on describing current engagement practices. As the ToC shows, the practices of 
shareholder engagement have been described as a combination of putting external pressure on 
management by means of formal shareholder rights, and more informal and collaborative forms of 
interaction (Ferraro and Beunza, 2014; O’Rourke, 2003). Existing studies show that shareholders are 
considered to bring information (Goodman et al., 2014), expertise (Logsdon and van Buren, 2009), 
novel issues (Goodman et al., 2014), novel ideas on the meaning and significance of an issue for the 
corporation (Ferraro and Beunza, 2014), novel frames on issues, particularly moral frames (Ferraro 
and Beunza, 2014) and publicity (Logsdon and van Buren, 2009). Moreover, current research show 
that shareholder resolutions focussing on socially responsible business practices (Guay et al., 2004; 
Sjöström, 2008) and a business case for ESG are “on the rise” (Allen et al., 2012; Gifford, 2012; Gond 
and Piani, 2012; Ferraro and Beunza, 2014). Unfortunately, no quantitative information about the 
amount of shareholder resolutions is available in the articles. A report from Eurosif (2006) shows that 
about 32% of the European pension fund equity allocation (i.e. 730 Billion Euros) uses engagement as 
a SRI strategy. In 2012 this figure increased already up to 1.95 Trillion Euros (Eurosif, 2012) 
 
However, we still do not fully understand the nature of the influence and impact of engagement 
(Allen et al., 2012). Over the last years, several publications have looked at the question of when and 
how shareholders are able to influence investee companies through direct communications. These 
studies focus on the shareholder side of engagement (Allen et al., 2012; Barber, 2006; Becht et al., 
2010), leaving the processes taking place within investee companies due to engagement under-
examined.  
2.3.5 How  does shareholder engagement affect investee companies? 
In order to know how shareholder engagement affects investee companies, it is also important to 
understand in what phase of the engagement the mechanisms behind shareholder engagement are 
at work. Based on existing literature, it seems that informal engagement usually proceeds in the 
following phases: first, an issue on which to engage has to be identified, and information has to be 
gathered (Goodman et al., 2014); second, a contact person at the investee company has to be found, 
and they have to agree to meet (Logsdon and van Buren, 2009); third, this internal contact person 
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has to be, or become, convinced of the importance of the issue, and advocate it within the investee 
company (Gifford, 2012; Ferraro and Beunza, 2014); and lastly, this internal advocate has to be 
supported in his or her internal advocacy (Ferraro and Beunza, 2014).  If a specific informal approach 
fails, a use of formal shareholder rights at the Annual General Meetings (AGM) may be the next step.  
AGM’s are important and formal instruments to put pressure on the investee company.  
 
According to Clark and Hebb (2004, p. 143), shareholder engagement could be understood as “a 
power shift within the firm away from managers and toward shareholders”. However, in our study 
we would like to define it as a power shift within the company away from some managers towards 
others with the support of the shareholders. Despite this power shift, the ability of investors to affect 
the investee company depends on the engagement tactic of the investor. According to McLaren 
(2004), the spectrum of engagement in governance is as follows: rational ignorance (passivity), 
alignment measure (promoting financial incentives to align managers’ interest), external control, 
internal governance (activism to protect voice and voting rights), dialogue and negotiation (dialogue 
and relational investing), board monitoring (influencing independence of the board) and proxy 
battles (for direct control). Exclusion strategies reduce the influence of the investor. Hence, exclusion 
means that the investor “can no longer exercise its rights to influence the company as an owner, by 
exercising influence at general meetings and through direct contact” (Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 
2009, p. 129, cited by Kolstad, 2016, p. 48). Moreover, Dimson et al. (2015) argued that collaboration 
among activists is instrumental in increasing the success rate of environmental and/or social 
engagement.  
 
Furthermore, it may be necessary to conceptualise how investee companies receive and process 
shareholder demands. Research shows that the strategic response of investee companies to 
shareholder activism depends on the shareholder influence and power (Hoffman, 1996; Sjöström, 
2008). This suggests that managers’ responses are symbolic; they settle with these powerful 
shareholders to demonstrate conformance but continue to resist making the substantive changes to 
core policies that can put their own interests at risk (David et al., 2007). Eccles et al. (2012) showed 
that companies with high CSR performance have better corporate governance systems in place. In 
line with this, Dimson et al. (2015) concluded that companies with inferior governance systems and 
socially conscious institutional investors are more likely to be engaged. It is also argued that success 
in engagement is more probable if the engaged company has reputational concerns and higher 
capacity to implement changes (Dimson et al, 2015). In line with this, large companies with special 
concern of society, such as tobacco, are more likely to be targeted with shareholder proposals 
(Rehbein et al., 2013; Sjöström, 2008).  
 
It is argued that companies that are targeted with formal shareholder proposals are likely to be more 
transparent (Michelon and Rodrigue, 2015). Moreover, the results of a case study about a 
shareholder activist campaign to stimulate responsible investments shows that a certain campaign 
has raised investor awareness, increased dialogue between the investor and the company, and has 
led to an increase in transparency and the disclosure of information among targeted companies 
(Ivanova, 2016). This reduces the information asymmetry between shareholders and managers 
(McLaren, 2004) and helps the organisation to raise awareness, build coalitions with the investors, 
change company policies, improve its corporate governance, and consequently, reduce agency costs. 
However, to achieve this, the willingness to communicate with investors is a requirement. Moreover, 
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if the investee company denies misbehaviour during the private dialogue, this is a threat for 
legitimacy of the company (Vandekerckhove et al., 2007; Sjöström, 2008).  
 
Multiple authors have stated that shareholder engagement seems to influence and leverage specific 
groups or departments within the company (Logsdon and van Buren, 2009; Gifford, 2012; Ferraro 
and Beunza, 2014). By supporting those already in favour of the amendments inside the company, 
shareholders appear to be able to support a minority fraction in such a way, that they become able 
to influence organisational decision-making.  
 
But how, exactly, do shareholders support these internal proponents? What makes minority fractions 
more influential? Whilst multiple authors have pointed to this characteristic, Ferraro and Beunza 
(2014) were the first to link it to social movement (Zald, Morrill & Rao 2005), which takes a political 
perspective on organisations. Organisations may present unified and coherent courses of actions just 
like states do. Internally however, minority fractions may have different ideas of what the proper 
goals and means for that particular organisation are. Social movements, a type of group actions like 
public discourse, development of certification or stakeholder activism,  can affect organisations, by 
supporting minorities in the company that have sustainability ideas and ambitions that are not 
directly in line with the strategy and goals of the company, in three ways. First, social movements can 
connect to alternative identities of employees that are in line with movement goals and urge them to 
reconnect to these identities. Secondly, social movements can influence the perception of 
organisational liabilities as well as risk perceptions and lead to a broader perception and openness to 
change. Thirdly, social movements can affect the internal organization, like task structures and 
groupings, in organisations. Social movements are loosely organized but sustained campaigns in 
support of a social goal, typically either the implementation or the prevention of a change in society’s 
structure or values. Although social movements differ in size, they are all 
essentially collective. Together, the authors argue that “social movements impact organisations not 
only by contributing to changing the costs and benefits of pursuing certain policies and practices, but 
also by changing the orientations and attitudes of organisational members. That means that we must 
pay attention to how movements contribute to the transformation of discourse, culture, symbolic 
categorisations, and frames” (Zald et al. 2005, p. 255). 
2.3.6 Feedback loop 
Goodman et al. (2014) argued that social shareholder engagement (SSE) is a change-seeking 
approach. The aim of this engagement is to get the companies going into a more sustainable 
behaviour. In order to improve the positive effects of shareholder engagement on the investee 
company, it is important that shareholders continually go through the phases of finding novel issues 
to engage on, gathering information on these issues, seek change by communication with the 
investee company, assess the outcomes of the communications and decide whether to adjust the 
issue or to close the engagement (Goodman et al., 2014). Only with this continually ongoing process, 
the desired effect that shareholder engagement can provide to both investee company as well as 
investors, can be fully exploited. Even though we have witnessed a dramatic ascendancy of what 
might be usefully referred to as social shareholder activism, we still have a limited understanding on 
whether it produces the intended outcomes as well as the mechanisms through which it influences 
corporate social behavior (Lee and Lounsbury, 2011). There is no research available actually showing 
the overall results of engagement (Logsdon and van Buren, 2009). In the interviews, we will dive into 
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this issue. We will discuss with the investors if they use engagement techniques on specific BNC 
themes and with the companies whether is this engagement resulted in changed practices.  
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3. Legal framework  
3.1 EU Directive 2014/95 
3.1.1 Scope and content 
Following up on the conclusion of the previous section stating that it is important that shareholders 
continually go through the phases of finding novel issues to engage on and gather information on 
these issues, it is important to examine the sources of information that are available to an investor. 
In that respect, it is important to note that in October 2014, the Council of the European Union and 
the European Parliament adopted Directive 2014/95/EU.3 This Directive amended existing EU 
legislation and introduced new provisions with regard to corporate disclosure of non-financial and 
diversity information by certain large undertakings and corporate groups (Lambooy, Diepeveen, Van 
‘t Foort 2015). The content of the Directive has to be implemented in the EU Member States' 
national legislation. The Directive stipulates that certain large undertakings, such as listed companies, 
banks and insurance companies,4 in excess of an average number of 500 employees shall include a 
‘non-financial statement’ in their annual report. A total of 18,000 companies operating in the EU are 
covered by Directive 2014/95.5 
The non-financial statement has to be included in the management report of these large companies. 
Insofar necessary for an understanding of the company’s development, position, performance and 
impact, Directive 2014/95 dictates what type of information must be included in the non-financial 
statement. The non-financial statement must include information on social and employee matters, 
environmental matters, human rights, anti-corruption and bribery.6 
Important in the context of our study is the Directive's requirement that a company must provide in 
its non-financial statement a brief description of its business model and the policies that were set up 
in relation to environmental matters, including due diligence processes that were implemented. 
Large companies must also report on the outcome of applying their environmental policies and on 
principal environmental risks related to their supply chains. Whenever a large company does not 
pursue any environmental policies, it shall have to explain why this is the case.7 
3.1.2 BNC  
Although Directive 2014/95 does not explicitly mention BNC, it does refer to both themes by 
requiring companies to report about environmental matters and by referring to international 
frameworks such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Reporting Guidelines and the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD MNE 
Guidelines) that include the topic of BNC (see section 3.1.3). Non-financial disclosure is considered a 
vital instrument in the transition towards a sustainable global economy whereby profits are 
                                                             
3 Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending 
Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large 
undertakings and groups (Directive 2014/95).  
4 European Commission, Non-financial reporting, <http://ec.europa.eu/finance/company-reporting/non-
financial_reporting/index_en.htm#legal-framework> accessed on: 6 December 2016. 
5 European Commission (2013), Impact Assessment (SWD(2013) 127 final), pp.35-36. 
6
 Article 1 (1) Directive 2014/95. 
7 Article 1 (1) Directive 2014/95. 
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combined with environmental protection. According to the Directive, in their reporting on 
environmental matters, large companies should include details of current or foreseeable 
environmental impacts as well as health and safety impacts. Among others, large companies have to 
report on their use of (non-)renewable energy, greenhouse gas emissions, air pollution and water 
use.8 Especially the latter issues resonate well with three of this research’s defined elements of BNC: 
climate change, chemicals and water use (see Chapter 1). 
According to Directive 2014/95, statutory auditors and audit firms should check whether a non-
financial statement has been provided by large companies. In addition to this requirement, EU 
Member States may require in their national legislation that the large companies include a third 
party verification of the information provided in their non-financial statement.9 
3.1.3 Reporting frameworks and guidance 
When disclosing information, companies may rely on national, EU-based or international (reporting) 
frameworks. Directive 2014/95 specifies a number of them, such as the Eco-Management and Audit 
Scheme, the United Nations (UN) Global Compact, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights, the OECD MNE Guidelines, ISO 26000, the International Labour Organisation's Tripartite 
Declaration of principles concerning multinational enterprises and social policy, and the GRI 
Reporting Guidelines. When reporting according to one of these standards, a large company must 
specify which framework it uses.10 A reporting framework that is not mentioned in Directive 2014/95, 
but that was mentioned in the 'Impact Assessment' Report, which preceded Directive 2014/95, is the 
Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP). The CDP framework assists companies in reporting to investors on 
themes such as carbon, energy, water, forests and climate issues, and offers a framework to assess 
the climate performance of companies.11 In the draft Order in Council (Algemene Maatregel van 
Bestuur) (see section 3.2.1) that implements the EU Directive in the Netherlands, the Natural Capital 
Protocol is available as a reporting framework.12 
BNC aspects are covered by all international (reporting) frameworks to which Directive 2014/95 
refers. For example, GRI developed four reporting guidelines about BNC. Companies have to report 
on issues covered by these guidelines if such issues are material, i.e. in case they have a significant 
impact on BNC and are of paramount importance to stakeholders (Lambooy 2013). Companies have 
to report about: (i) operational sites owned, leased or managed in (the vicinity) of areas of a high 
BNC value; (ii) significant impacts they may have on BNC; (iii) habitats that they protected or 
restored; and/or (iv) species that are affected by their operations.13 
At the time of writing, the European Commission is still developing non-binding guidelines on a 
methodology for reporting on non-financial information. In September 2016, the European 
Commission compiled a report following a public consultation from January to April 2016. The 
                                                             
8 Preamble Directive 2014/95. 
9 Preamble and Article 1(6) Directive 2014/95. 
10 Preamble Directive 2014/95. 
11 European Commission (2013), Impact Assessment (SWD(2013) 127 final), p.57. 
12 Besluit houdende regels ter uitvoering van richtlijn 2014/95/EU van het Europees Parlement en van de Raad 
van 22 oktober 2014 tot wijziging van richtlijn 2013/34/EU met betrekking tot de bekendmaking van niet-
financiële informatie en informatie inzake diversiteit door bepaalde grote ondernemingen en groepen (PbEU 
2014, L 330), p.6. 
13 GRI (2013), G4 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines. Implementation Manual, pp.100-104. 
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responses show some ambiguity when it comes to the exact formation of the guidelines. Some key 
findings are enumerated in Table 1. 
Table 1 Key findings in the consultation of the European Commission on guidelines for reporting 
non-financial information14. 
Theme Finding 
Detailed guidelines or not? Some argue for more detailed guidelines, whilst others argue 
that the guidelines should not be detailed on specific sectoral 
or thematic issues. 
Including best practices or 
examples in the guidelines. 
Many respondents opt for including best practices or examples 
on non-financial reporting in the guidelines. 
Including general principles and 
key performance indicators in the 
guidelines. 
A focus must be on general principles and reference could be 
made to key performance indicators in accepted frameworks. 
The guidelines may also explain how other frameworks could 
be best applied within the purview of Directive 2014/95. 
Key themes for in the guidelines. Materiality was addressed as a key issue and, to a lesser extent, 
the comparability of information. Information was considered 
material when it is useful for understanding the impact of the 
company’s activities, to understand the position of the 
company, in ascertaining how a company manages its non-
financial risks and when information is relevant to shareholders 
and investors in decision-making processes. 
 
3.1.4 Transposition in national legislation 
EU Member States were obliged to transpose the rules contained in Directive 2014/95 into national 
legislation by the end of 2016. Figure 5 shows the status of transposition as per the beginning of 
December 2016.15 As depicted in Figure 5, just five EU member states16 have transposed Directive 
2014/95 into national legislation. The other member states are still lagging behind.17 The Netherlands 
has transposed Directive 2014/95 on 6 December 2016.18 
                                                             
14 European Commission (2016), Feedback statement on the public consultation on the non-binding guidelines 
for reporting on non-financial information by companies having taken place from 15 January to 15 April 2016, 
pp.2-23. 
15 2 December 2016. 
16 Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg and Slovakia. 
17 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The 
Netherlands was still included on the list. 
18 Besluit van 18 november 2016 tot vaststelling van het tijdstip van inwerkingtreding van de Wet van 28 
september 2016, houdende wijziging van Boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek ter uitvoering van Richtlijn 
2014/95/EU van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 22 oktober 2014 tot wijziging van richtlijn 
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Figure 5 Transposition status Directive 2014/9519 
 
3.2 Regulatory framework in the Netherlands 
3.2.1 Reporting 
Since 2005, pursuant to the EU Modernisation Directive,20 article 2:391 of the Dutch Civil Code (DCC) 
contains stipulations regarding non-financial information disclosure. Pursuant to this provision, 
companies must publish an annual report (bestuursverslag), which provide – among others – ‘a true 
and fair view’ of the state of affairs of the company, of the developments that occurred during the 
financial year and of the results that the company achieved. If necessary for a good understanding, 
non-financial performance indicators as regards environmental and social matters must be 
included.21 The same applies to groups of companies, in which cases the parent company must 
provide a consolidated annual report on the affairs of all group companies. 
In December 2016, article 2:391 DCC was amended to meet the transposition requirements of 
Directive 2014/95.22 Accordingly, article 2:391(5) DCC currently states that additional requirements 
regarding the content of the annual report can be laid down in an Order in Council.23 A draft version 
of the Order in Council has been promulgated by the Dutch government in January 2017. The articles 
of the Order in Council resemble the articles of Directive 2014/95.24  In this way, the additional 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
2013/34/EU met betrekking tot de bekendmaking van niet-financiële informatie en informatie inzake diversiteit 
door bepaalde grote ondernemingen en groepen (PbEU 2014, L 330) Stb. 2016, 451. 
19 European Commission, Monitoring implementation and enforcement of Directives, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/finance/enforcement/directives/index_en.htm#non-financial-reporting> lastly visited: 11 
January 2017. 
20 Directive 2003/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2003 amending Directives 
78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC, 86/635/EEC and 91/674/EEC on the annual and consolidated accounts of certain 
types of companies, banks and other financial institutions and insurance undertakings. 
21 Article 2:391(1) DCC. 
22 Wet van 28 september 2016, houdende wijziging van Boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek ter uitvoering van 
Richtlijn 2014/95/EU van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 22 oktober 2014 tot wijziging van richtlijn 
2013/34/EU met betrekking tot de bekendmaking van niet-financiële informatie en informatie inzake diversiteit 
door bepaalde grote ondernemingen en groepen (PbEU 2014, L 330), Stb. 2016, 352. 
23 Draft versions of the Order in Council have been made available by the Dutch government. The draft 
resembles the content of Directive 2014/95. External verification is limited to whether the non-financial 
statement is included in the annual report, not whether the content of the statement is correct. 
24
 According to the draft Order in Council, external verification is not limited to whether the non-financial 
statement is included in the annual report, but also entails a check of whether the content of the statement is 
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requirements pertaining to the non-financial statement as prescribed by Directive 2014/95 are 
included in Dutch corporate law.25  
To conclude, large listed companies and other designated large companies must disclose as of 1 
January 2017 more relevant corporate information on BNC as well as on their policies to detect risks 
and prevent risks, i.e. risks for the company itself and for other stakeholders. The provision of 
information may follow certain designated frameworks such as the GRI standards or the OECD MNE 
Guidelines. This type of information is one of the sources of information for the company's 
stakeholders such as shareholders, including asset managers and fund managers. In the next section, 
we will examine the rights that are granted under Dutch law to shareholders.  
3.2.2 Powers of the general meeting of shareholders 
According to Dutch law, the general meeting of shareholders has various powers. Figure 6 offers an 
overview of the rights endowed to the general meeting of shareholders. Among others, the most 
material competency of the general meeting of shareholders is the power to take one or more of the 
following decisions: to issue more shares, to decide on a reduction of the issued share capital, to 
liquidate the company, to adopt the annual accounts, to amend the articles of association, to require 
information from the board, and to appoint, suspend and dismiss (supervisory) board members. For 
example, asset managers and fund managers can propose that the company provides the general 
meeting with information about the company's BNC relationships, including negative impact, positive 
impact and dependencies. Or they can propose that the general meeting will not adopt the annual 
accounts if the company does not provide such information or answers to questions of shareholders 
in that respect. Suspending or replacing directors and/or supervisory board members is another 
strong instrument available to the general meeting. The general meeting generally decides with a 
simple majority, that is 50% of the votes plus one, however, the articles of association may provide 
otherwise. Hence, a single asset manager or fund manager cannot implement any of such measures 
by itself as long as it does not have the majority in the general meeting. What often happens in these 
cases is that an asset manager or fund manager forms an alliance with other shareholders in order to 
put pressure on the board to address the proposals of such a shareholder group, e.g. by submitting a 
shareholder resolution to the general meeting about which the meeting must vote. In section 2.3.4 
above, we noted that shareholder resolutions are "on the rise", becoming more popular as an 
investors' instrument.  
In addition, shareholders also have a right to propose items for the agenda of the annual general 
meeting. A group of 3% of the shareholders (capital rights and/or voting rights) can use this 
instrument. For example, they can propose as a subject for the agenda that the company will follow 
the CDP rules in reporting on greenhouse gas emissions. Or, that the company develops a BNC policy. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
correct (Article 5 Besluit houdende regels ter uitvoering van richtlijn 2014/95/EU van het Europees Parlement 
en van de Raad van 22 oktober 2014 tot wijziging van richtlijn 2013/34/EU met betrekking tot de 
bekendmaking van niet-financiële informatie en informatie inzake diversiteit door bepaalde grote 
ondernemingen en groepen (PbEU 2014, L 330) (Besluit bekendmaking niet-financiële informatie)). 
25 Article 2:391(5) DCC; Besluit van 18 november 2016 tot vaststelling van het tijdstip van inwerkingtreding van 
de Wet van 28 september 2016, houdende wijziging van Boek 2 van het Burgerlijk Wetboek ter uitvoering van 
Richtlijn 2014/95/EU van het Europees Parlement en de Raad van 22 oktober 2014 tot wijziging van richtlijn 
2013/34/EU met betrekking tot de bekendmaking van niet-financiële informatie en informatie inzake diversiteit 
door bepaalde grote ondernemingen en groepen (PbEU 2014, L 330), Stb. 2016, 451. 
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The company's board may decide whether it will submit the agenda item in a vote to the general 
meeting or, alternatively, will just discuss the item in the meeting. 
Finally, shareholders can include in the company's articles of association that they have the right to 
give directions to the company's board. Again, this right does not relate to an individual shareholder 
but belongs to the general meeting.  
To conclude, Dutch law grants various rights to shareholders so that they can exercise influence in 
regard of material issues. Most rights are allocated to the general meeting of shareholders, which 
usually decides with a simple majority. Shareholders can also combine their rights and form alliances 
with which they can exert pressure on the management. One of the rights pertains to information 
provision by the company to the shareholders. In view of our research question, we note that 
engagement can involve that asset managers and fund managers require (more specific) BNC 
information of companies, including scenario analyses concerning material risks caused by the 
deterioration of BNC and possible solutions to which the company can contribute. 
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Figure 6 Powers of the general meeting of shareholders 
 
 
3.3 BNC reporting and accounting standards 
The next step in our analysis is to find out what material risks and materiality means in terms of 
corporate reporting. We will briefly indicate which norms apply in this field. 
The mainstream international accounting principles are the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS)26 - which apply to Dutch listed companies - and the U.S. Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (US GAAP) - which can also apply to Dutch listed companies, i.e. in the situation 
in which their shares or derivatives are (also) listed on a stock exchange in the US. Both sets of 
standards require the reporting of all issues ‘material’ to a company. ‘Materiality of information’ is 
defined as being so relevant that its omission or misstatement could influence the economic 
decisions of users of the annual report.27 It is therefore in the first place up to the company and its 
accountant to decide whether or not BNC impacts and dependencies are material in this sense and 
hence need reporting. 
                                                             
26 IFRS is mandatory for companies listed on EU stock exchanges. 
27 This is defined in the IASB framework. For a reference to this definition see: http://www.ifrs.org/Current-
Projects/IASB-Projects/Conceptual-Framework/Other-Public-Meetings-Observer-
Notes/Documents/0509wss03.pdf > accessed on: 15 January 2017 
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Some supervisors have gone beyond this, explicitly requiring the reporting of certain risks associated 
with BNC. A development that started at emerging countries like Brazil and Bangladesh with 
economies that are particularly dependent on natural capital and with often less strict 
implementation of laws and regulations meant to protect natural capital (UNEP Inquiry 2015). 
France has recently introduced a law (article 173 of the Energy Transition Act) pursuant to which 
financial risks related to climate change must be reported by listed companies. Furthermore, 
institutional investors have to report on how their policies align with the national strategy for 
addressing transitions to a low-carbon economy.28  
                                                             
28 The official French text can be found here: 
<www.legifrance.gouv.fr/eli/loi/2015/8/17/DEVX1413992L/jo#JORFARTI000031045547 > accessed on: 6 
December 2016. See for English commentaries: UNPRI et al. (2016), French Energy Transition Law. Global 
Investor Briefing, pp.6-9.  
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4. BNC and finance: current state of affairs  
In the previous chapters, we argued that the worldwide deterioration of BNC is a relevant risk factor 
for both companies and their investors. We discussed that asset managers and fund managers have 
several strategies to cope with these risks. In this chapter, we will sketch the current state of affairs 
of how asset - and fund managers take BNC factors into account as found in the literature. We will 
also discuss the barriers that keep investors from integrating BNC factors more fully in their 
investment strategies.  
4.1 Investors' strategies for taking BNC into account 
4.1.1 Growing investors' interest in corporate BNC performance  
Research completed in 2010 on integrating companies' impact and dependence on BNC29 in 
investment decisions revealed that institutional investors were ‘not very interested’ in the BNC 
performance of investee companies (Lambooy, 2010b). Asset managers and fund managers seldom 
requested information about BNC-friendly investments from sustainability rating agencies (for 
example Sustainalytics or RobecoSAM). Also, asset managers did not assess BNC in investment 
decision-making processes, hardly understood the implications BNC loss could have on business, and 
they found it difficult to ascertain the business risks of BNC issues (Lambooy, 2010b). In general, a 
sense of urgency regarding BNC issues was lacking amongst asset managers.  
This attitude has changed. The Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB)30 has for example 
developed a materiality map pointing out for which economic sectors BNC is judged to be of 
‘material’ importance (Figure 7 below). 
Figure 7 SASB Materiality map31  
 
 
 
However, although BNC risks sometimes are identified by asset managers or fund managers, so far, 
literature and our empirical study reveal that there is little progress in terms of risk assessment. In 
case a BNC risk is assessed, this is almost exclusively done in a stand-alone fashion, i.e. unrelated to 
the main risk framework. 
                                                             
29 The author speaks about Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (BES) which is comparable to BNC. 
30 The SASB is an independent non-profit aiming to develop and disseminate sustainability accounting 
standards that help public companies to disclose decision-useful information to investors. 
31 http://www.sasb.org/materiality/sasb-materiality-map/ accessed on 13th of December 2016. 
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4.1.2 Different approaches of BNC integration 
In Chapter 2, we explained the different approaches for asset managers and fund managers eager to 
integrate BNC into their decision-making framework. In a more practical fashion, these different 
approaches lead to different strategies to reduce risk and to seize opportunities.  
4.1.2.1 Setting minimum norms and engage or exclude 
The first way to take BNC performance of companies into account is through setting some kind of 
minimum norm or threshold that each company needs to take. This can be formulated along policy 
or governance lines, like having a certain policy in place to flag and mitigate BNC issues, or can be in 
terms of certain real exposures. 
The use of exclusion with regard to the worst offenders of international agreements is widespread, 
being often the first step taken when it comes to responsible investment. By 2016 the UN-backed 
Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) has been signed by more than 1500 asset owners and 
managers over 50 countries, representing US$60 trillion in assets under management.  
The uptake has been particularly strong among Dutch pension funds. According to a survey 
conducted by the Dutch central bank in 2016, nearly 90% of the more than 200 pension funds 
surveyed have put in place a RI policy to some extent (DNB, 2016). 
The role played by BNC in these exclusion strategies is unknown but they mostly focus on human 
rights violations.  
4.1.2.2 Integrating BNC in risk analysis and valuation models 
Despite the fact that over the recent years several tools have been developed to assist financial 
institutions in assessing BNC related risk, a scoping study of the Natural Capital Declaration (NCD) 
found that only a few financial institutions were systematically quantifying their exposure to these 
risks and opportunities at a portfolio level (NCD, 2015a). With regard to investments, the picture is 
rather similar as nearly 50% of asset managers do not analyse climate risks and opportunities at all 
(High Meadows Institute, 2015). Given the poorer data and generally perceived materiality of other 
BNC themes, the overall picture will most probably be even less positive.  
The Dutch Association of Investors for Sustainable Development (VBDO, 2014) has sketched the 
development of approaches to the use of ESG data where these play an increasingly central role, 
literally integrated, in the process of risk analysis and investment valuation.  
 
First ESG information is collected and analysed whole separate from the financial analyses. An ESG 
analyst presents his conclusions separate to the portfolio managers who needs then to decide how 
to use this information. For instance, when the ESG analysis shows that minimum norms are not 
respected the portfolio manager may exclude the stock. 
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Figure 8 ESG and financial analysis made in separate way 
 
 
 
Source: VBDO (2014) 
 
In the next phase,  the ESG and financial analysis are integrated. There is still a specialisation, the 
financial analysis is still initially made regardless of ESG information, but the portfolio manager 
receives one integrated analysis.  
 
Figure 9 Integration of ESG and financial analysis 
 
 
 
Source: VBDO (2014) 
 
Full integration is achieved when the financial analyst uses both the financial and ESG information in 
an integrated manner. ESG is thus one of the many factors taken into account when making the 
valuation of a company. Here the role of the ESG-department is much less analysing the data itself, 
but rather training the financial analyst and portfolio manager in the use of the ESG information, 
recent developments in the field etc. Here it is possible that the ‘sustainability’ department is smaller 
while sustainability information does play its full role in the investment process. 
 
Figure 10 Full integration of ESG in the investment process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: VBDO (2014) 
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Box 4 Robeco integrates ESG performance in equity valuation 
Asset manager Robeco has integrated the valuation of the ESG performance of companies in its valuation of 
equities. Since January 2014, its financial analysts are required to explicitly quantify the impact of the most 
material ESG issues in their analysis. Analysis of the first results show that ‘environmental management’ and 
BNC factors such as ‘climate strategy’ and ‘product stewardship’ are especially material in the resources sectors 
(energy, materials, industrials and utilities). ESG was decisive in 9% of 178 portfolio changes made and in 28% it 
played an important role. The effect of ESG factors on the valuation (the so called ‘target price’) is 5% overall, 
and 10% for those equities where a change was made on the basis of ESG-factors. Target price changes ranged 
from -23% to +71%. The very preliminary findings of the impact on the financial performance are also positive. 
As the ESG-driven portfolio decisions outperformed their relative sector indices on average by over 5% 
annualised (Schramade, 2016).   
 
4.1.2.3 BNC engagement 
The UN Principles for Responsible Investment (UNPRI) has an ESG engagement team that identifies 
key ESG themes and orchestrates collaborative initiatives, such as engagements between UNPRI 
signatories and companies.32 Through their collaborative platform, UNPRI signatories can endorse 
joint letters to companies, request support for shareholder resolutions and can jointly engage on 
specific ESG-related themes.33 Key environmental themes selected by UNPRI are palm oil, fracking, 
climate change and water scarcity.34 In particular, UNPRI guidance is aimed at climate change 
lobbying and water scarcity in the agricultural sector. In the former case, guidance is provided for 
companies that display a certain incongruity between their own actions and their support to trade 
associations, think tanks or other third parties in relation to climate change.35 In the latter case, 
guidance concentrates on the largest user of fresh water, the agricultural sector, and takes a first 
step towards an exploratory engagement through dialogue with 54 corporations.36   
4.1.2.4 Public affairs and lobby policies 
Recognising that they cannot isolate themselves from climate change, investors have joined forces to 
influence the public policymakers to take the necessary steps to reduce climate change. In the run-up 
to COP21, 350 investors representing more than US$24 trillion in assets under management called on 
the world leaders to forge a meaningful and ambitious climate agreement, in recognition of the risks 
that climate change presents to their investments. However, no such initiative of the financial 
institutions was taken in the run up to the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
                                                             
32 UNPRI, ESG Engagements, <www.unpri.org/about/pri-teams/esg-engagements> accessed on 16 August 
2016. 
33 UNPRI, Collaboration Platform <www.unpri.org/about/pri-teams/esg-engagements/collaboration-platform> 
accessed on 16 August 2016. More information on exact engagements is only available for UNPRI signatories. 
34 UNPRI, ESG Engagements, <www.unpri.org/about/pri-teams/esg-engagements> accessed on 16 August 
2016. 
35 UNPRI, Investor expectations on corporate climate lobbying, p.1. 
36
 UNPRI, PRI-coordinated engagement on water risks in agricultural supply chains. Investor guidance 
document, pp.8 and 16-20. 
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4.1.2.5 Request for disclosure and transparency 
Financial institutions also voiced their need for data. More than 822 institutional investors, 
representing over US$95 trillion in assets, are signatories of the CDP and asked companies worldwide 
to disclose their carbon emissions and how they are managing climate change issues. With the 
Montreal Carbon Pledge, 120 investors representing over US$10 trillion in assets, committed to 
disclosing the carbon footprint of their investment portfolios (Novethic 2016, p. 4). 
A limited number of financial institutions are involved in developing BNC accounting methodologies. 
BNC accounting could help investors to make better decisions and take BNC into account in risk 
assessment and valuation tools. Mostly through contributing in kind, testing beta versions and 
requiring companies to disclose their BNC impact. Following the cooperation around the Natural 
Capital Protocol (NCP) a new role for financial institutions seems to be emerging as corporations and 
financial institutions (and NGOs) give a different priority to reporting. This can be seen in the 
discussion on the application of the NCP. This has amongst the primary intended applications to help 
financial investors make decisions about the management of their asset portfolios by enabling 
comparisons of the sustainability of peer-group companies and their management of natural capital 
resources. However, in line with the preference of most of its corporate members the Natural Capital 
Coalition explicitly states that the NCP is primarily meant to support better decision making, and not 
as a reporting framework: “although it will aim to standardise the process for assessing impacts and 
dependencies on natural capital, it is not intended that it should provide absolute comparability of 
results for external disclosure” (NCC 2016, p. 3). Most corporate stakeholders stated that “reporting 
externally on natural capital was not yet a corporate priority” (NCC 2016, p.19). 
4.1.2.6 Setting quantified goals to reduce exposure 
Despite the fact that data often lack we see that asset owners, and in their slipstream asset 
managers and fund managers, increasingly set themselves goals for the reduction of  the exposure of 
their portfolio to in particular carbon emissions. By signing the Portfolio Decarbonisation Coalition, 
27 investors with in total over US$300 billion in assets under management pledged to gradually 
reduce their carbon exposure (UNEP FI 2016, p. 5). In the Netherlands the two largest pension funds, 
ABP and PFZW, set themselves the goal to reduce the carbon footprint of their portfolio in 2020 with 
respectively 25% and 50%.   
4.2 Barriers to the integration of BNC in investment decisions 
Whereas BNC is seen as material in several sectors by most companies and investors, real integration 
of the risk assessment is still limited. What keeps financial institutions from fully integrating BNC in 
their risk assessment? The main reasons mentioned are limited budgets, personnel and capabilities 
to analyse BNC risks (NCD, 2015b), resource constraints, knowledge and understanding and/or 
personal misconceptions of ESG issues, competing organisational priorities, existing disagreement 
about good practices for responsible investment, and fiduciary duties (UNEP FI et al. 2015).37  
                                                             
37 I.e. a party prudently and loyally acting in the interest of another, be it its clients or other beneficiaries such 
as pension holders. UNEP Finance Initiative et al. (2015), Fiduciary duty in the 21st century, pp.14-18; UNEP 
Finance Initiative et al. (2015), Complying you’re your fiduciary duty: A global roadmap for ESG integration. 
Freshfields: 10 years on. 
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4.2.1 Lack of long-term incentives to take BNC into account 
In career promotion decisions, asset management firms give more credits to employees who have 
developed into generalists than to employees who have developed specific expertise such as in the 
field of BNC and related risks. Moreover, by setting short-term performance criteria for asset 
managers, systemic barriers were created that prevent asset managers to fully invest in 
comprehending BNC aspects in an investment context (Lambooy, 2010b).  
 
Timelines for financial decision-making are often based on short-term financial objectives at the 
expense of long-term performance (Haldane and Davies 2011; Fink 2016, WRR 2016). A McKinsey 
survey found that 63% of board members of companies feel increasingly under pressure to 
demonstrate short-term financial performance. While 86% of the same respondents believed that 
taking a longer time perspective in business decisions, would positively affect corporate performance 
(Barton and Wiseman, 2014). 
 
Short-term pressures on companies often come from investors, such as institutional shareholders. 
This is paradoxical, given the liabilities of pension funds and insurance companies that stretch over 
generations.  
 
Reasons that are given for this short-termism are the following (van Tilburg, Demmers, and Remmers 
2016; Ambachtsheer and McLaughlin 2015; van Tilburg 2009):  
 Regulation (e.g. overstressing the importance of liquidity); 
 Social pressures from the sector (to stay in line with the benchmark and the general market 
expectations); 
 Missing a clear long-term investment model with appropriate performance criteria; 
 Perverse incentives throughout the subcontracting chain (i.e. selection of performers and 
methods of reward); and 
 The availability of real-time and easy to handle short-term financial data (i.e. availability 
bias). 
4.2.2 Fiduciary duty 
Around ESG and finance there is a long standing discussion whether taking ESG factors into account 
is permissible under the fiduciary duty that financial institutions have, the legal obligation of one 
party to act in the best interest of another. Traditionally, opponents of ESG integration argue that 
fiduciary duties make it hard or even impossible to actually practice ESG integration. In their view, a 
focus on ESG issues leads to a trade-off with investment performance. Proponents of ESG integration 
assert the exact opposite. According to proponents, fiduciary duties may impose an obligation to 
integrate ESG issues and not integrating such issues may be seen as a breach of fiduciary duties 
(UNEP Finance Initiative et al., 2015 pp.14-18).  
 
In 2005, a group of UNEP FI asset managers together with legal firm Freshfields, published a ground-
breaking report titled: A Legal Framework for the Integration of Environmental, Social and 
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Governance Issues into Institutional Investment.38 The report, widely referred to as the Freshfields 
report, argued that “integrating ESG considerations into an investment analysis so as to more reliably 
predict financial performance is clearly permissible and is arguably required in all jurisdictions.” In 
the months that followed, a group of investors, led by UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, developed 
and subsequently launched the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) at the New York Stock 
Exchange. The six principles commit signatories to integrate ESG issues into investment decision-
making and ownership practices.39 
 
In the last decade, the discussion has continued and UNPRI, UNEP FI, UNEP Inquiry and Generation 
Investment Management launched a statement in June 2016. In their statement, the parties call on 
policy makers to clarify investors’ duties and obligations in relation to ESG integration.40  
4.2.3 Lack of company BNC data 
The availability of data concerning corporate impact and dependency on BNC is considered 
insufficient, even for the best-developed BNC theme of carbon. As the taskforce on climate related 
financial disclosures (TCFD) noted: “Users of climate-related financial disclosure commonly identify 
inconsistencies in disclosure practices, a lack of context for information, and incomparable reporting 
as major obstacles” (2016, p 3). 
Also research providers and consultancies can give only partial insight into the BNC related risks and 
opportunities. In its scoping study, the NCD (2015b) found that: 
 Only 26 out of 66 research providers and consultants have detailed methodologies available 
to offer environmental risk-related research or capacity to analyse company performance on 
BNC factors; 
 Eight of the 66 research providers and consultants have quantitative capabilities with BNC 
datasets; and 
 The most common BNC indicators on which research providers and consultants focus are 
GHG-emissions, water risks, climate risks and air pollution. Few methodologies focus on 
indicators like agricultural production and over-exploitation risks, forestry and land use and 
wider pollution impacts.  
4.2.3.1 Carbon accounting 
After the GHG-protocol was established, and thanks to the work of the CDP, currently over 4,500 
companies provide some form of carbon data, including 82% of the 500 biggest companies in the 
world (CDP 2014, Rogers 2015). Which is not to say that carbon accounting and reporting is where it 
should be. Especially with regard to forward-looking statements there is still a lack of information. 
Data from the SASB on the 2014 financial filings by the top US-listed companies shows that 27% of 
companies identified no climate risk at all. Of the 70% that did, only 15% used metrics, and 40% only 
                                                             
38 UNEP Finance Initiative et al. (2005), A legal framework for the integration of environmental, social and 
governance issues into institutional investment, 
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/freshfields_legal_resp_20051123.pdf. 
39 Freshfield, Complying With Your Fiduciary Duty: A Global Roadmap For ESG Integration Freshfields: 10 Years,  
http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/complying_with_fiduciary_duty.pdf. 
40
 UNEP Finance Initiative et al. (2016), Fiduciary duty in the 21st century. Global statement on investor 
obligations and duties, p.3.  
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“broad, nonspecific wording”. Users of climate-related financial disclosure commonly identify 
inconsistencies in disclosure practices, a lack of context for information, and incomparable reporting 
(Rogers 2015, Taskforce 2016).   
4.2.3.2 Biodiversity and land use  
MacLaughlin, van der Kruijf and van Dijk (2015) show that of the 265 companies within the six 
industries evaluated (diversified metals, food products, oil & gas producers, paper products and 
forestry, precious metals and steel): 
 80% report on BNC and land use issues through the identification of risks and implicitly 
through their related activities;  
 56% directly recognise BNC issues and implement programmes to address their impacts; and 
 The average quality of reporting of those companies that report on BNC and land use issues 
is considered weak. 
4.2.3.3 Water use  
The same study shows that of the 373 companies assessed across four industries that have a 
relatively high impact on local water demand and at the same time are vulnerable to reduced water 
supply (food products, paper and forestry, precious metals, and steel): 
 65% report on their management of recognised water use issues; 
 Of the companies reporting on water extraction only 41% provided information on their 
water consumption; 
 The average reporting quality of the companies that report on water issues is considered 
adequate; and 
 Between the four industries, food product companies had the highest percentage of 
companies with strong water management systems at 40%. 
In sum, this chapter sketched the current state of affairs of the interaction between BNC and finance, 
and more specifically in regard of asset management and fund management. In literature, we found 
a growing interest of investors in corporate BNC performance. We also distinguished different 
approaches of BNC integration by investors and possible barriers for such integration, such as the 
lack of long-term incentives to take BNC into account. In the next chapter, we will delve into these 
issues, and more, even further and we will try to corroborate the findings from literature through 
empirical findings retrieved from interviews. 
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5. Interview results and analysis 
This chapter presents the findings from the interviews with companies and asset managers and fund 
managers. First, we will present the interviewees. Then we will present the outcomes of the 
interviews with the asset managers and the companies respectively. 
5.1 Investors and companies interviewed 
5.1.1 Investors 
A broad range of investors was selected. Of the ten asset managers interviewed the largest held 
US$5,100 billion of assets under management (BlackRock, the biggest asset manager in the world) 
whereas the smallest (Triodos IM) has €3 billion of assets under management. 
Some of the asset managers also manage their own proprietary assets of the insurance business 
(Aegon, NNIP). MN, SPF Beheer and PGGM manage mostly the assets of the same pension fund that 
own the asset manager, while the others are wholly independent companies. 
BlackRock and BMO are both active in the Netherlands, but only for a small part of their overall 
business. Robeco originates from the Netherlands (Rotterdam), but now has Japanese owners 
(previous owner was the Rabobank).  
As mentioned, MN, SPF Beheer and PGGM are owned by Dutch pension funds or only have Dutch 
clients (the asset owners). Aegon and NNIP are Dutch by origin but have clients worldwide. Aegon 
and NNIP are listed on the Dutch stock exchange, but given the international nature of their 
shareholders, the majority of their shareholders are from abroad.  
Lastly, most asset managers work exclusively or predominantly for institutional parties (mostly 
pension funds), except BlackRock and Triodos IM. BlackRock is one of the biggest asset managers for 
retail clients and Triodos IM works almost exclusively for retail clients via Triodos Bank branches and 
third party distributors. 
Table 2 provides an overview of some basic characteristics of the investors that were interviewed. 
Table 2 Characteristics investors interviewed 
 Core business Assets under 
management 
Number of 
employees 
Operational 
focus 
ACTIAM41 Fund and asset manager €55 billion 130 National 
Aegon42 Financial services 
organisation (life 
insurances, pensions 
and asset management) 
€707 billion 31,530 International 
BlackRock43 Investment manager US$5,100 billion 12,000 International 
                                                             
41 ACTIAM, About us, <www.actiam.nl/en/who-we-are/> accessed on: 8 December 2016. 
42 Aegon, At a glance, <www.aegon.com/en/Home/About/At-a-glance/>; Aegon, Aegon today, 
<www.aegon.com/en/Home/Investors/Aegon-in-2015/> both accessed on: 8 December 2016. 
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 BlackRock (2016), Built for change. Annual report 2015, p.10; BlackRock, About BlackRock, 
<www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-us/about-us> accessed on: 8 December 2016. 
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BMO44 Asset manager US$238 billion 6,40045 International 
MN46 Pension fund service 
provider 
€114 billion 1,206 National 
NNIP47 Asset manager €199 billion 1,200 International 
PGGM48 Pension fund service 
provider 
€200 billion 1,363 National 
Robeco49 Asset manager €276 billion 1,218 International 
SPF Beheer50 Pension fund service 
provider 
€18 billion 195 National 
Triodos IM51 Impact investor €3 billion 137 International 
 
The interviews with these asset managers were held with different finance professionals. Mostly with 
people that work primarily on responsible investing and within the office responsible for 
engagement. Some of the interviewees have a commercial background or previously worked as a 
financial analyst. 
5.1.2 Companies 
A limited amount of five companies were initially selected to be included in this research. One of the 
companies indicated that the role of investors on their BNC performance is very limited. The results 
of this company are not further taken into account. The remaining four companies are mainly 
frontrunners or companies that aim for a strong sustainability performance. Table 3 provides an 
overview of some basic characteristics of the companies interviewed. 
Table 3 Characteristics companies interviewed 
 Core business Number of 
employees 
Revenue Operational focus 
AkzoNobel Chemicals 45,586 €14,86 billion International 
Corbion Bioproducts 1,673 €0,918 billion International 
DSM  Chemicals 21,819 €8,9     billion International 
Heijmans Construction 8,000 €1,98   billion International 
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 BMO Global Asset Management, About us, <www.bmo.com/gam/about-us/g/overview> accessed on: 8 
December 2016. 
45 This also includes BMO Insurance, BMO Nesbitt Burns, BMO InvestorLine and BMO’s Private Banking. 
46 MN, Homepage, <www.mn.nl/en/> accessed on: 8 December 2016. 
47 NN Investment Partners, About us, <https://nnip-careers.com/about-us/> accessed on: 8 December 2016. 
48 PGGM (2016), Annual Report 2015, p.33; PGGM, Who we are, <www.pggm.nl/english/who-we-
are/Pages/Default.aspx> accessed on: 8 December 2016. 
49 Robeco, Facts and figures, <www.robeco.com/en/about-us/facts-figures.jsp>; Robeco, Over Robeco, 
<www.robeco.com/nl/over-ons/over-robeco.jsp> both accessed on: 8 December 2016. 
50 SPF Beheer, Kenmerken, <www.spfbeheer.nl/Wie-zijn-we/Kenmerken> accessed on: 8 December 2016. 
51
 Triodos IM (2016), Annual report 2015, p.8; Triodos IM, Who we are, <www.triodos.com/en/investment-
management/who-we-are/> accessed on: 8 December 2016. 
  43 
5.2 Outcome and analysis of interviews with asset managers 
5.2.1 BNC and investors’ objectives 
When asked whether the respondents were primarily financially driven or ethically driven the 
majority replied they were both. None responded that they were exclusively ethically driven; 
financial returns are relevant to all respondents. More than a third responded that they were 
primarily financially driven. However, also these respondents recognised the materiality of BNC for 
their financial performance, and hence the need to take this into account in setting and executing its 
investment strategy (see Figure 11). 
Figure 11 Finance first or ethics first investor 
 
Most  respondents indicated that BNC has moved up on the agenda in recent years. Whereas some 
have been active with BNC for a longer time, the frontrunners amongst the mainstream respondents 
around 10 years, others have only truly started to integrate BNC into their financial analysis quite 
recently (last 1-2 years). Based on the interviews we can conclude that BNC has moved from a niche 
to the mainstream. Which is not to say that it currently plays a very large role with all respondents.  
BNC integration has started from a (reputational) risk focus, and has moved to a credit, liability or 
market risk, driven by regulation. Increasingly also BNC-specific opportunities are recognised. About 
50% of the interviewed investors say BNC has a positive impact on the perspective of the investor on 
the investee company.  
Figure 12 Is BNC a material factor for the financial performance of investee companies? 
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Also, the recently adopted Sustainable Development Goals, which include goals in the field of water, 
biodiversity, climate, land use, poverty and others, are driving interest in BNC amongst investors. 
The internationally active asset managers mentioned the European, and specifically Dutch, asset 
owners (mostly pension funds) as one of the main drivers for taking BNC into account. These asset 
owners expect integration of BNC aspects in the investment process as well as engagement in this 
field when necessary.  
However, most asset managers indicated that they are themselves very much aware of the 
materiality of BNC and thus do not need asset owners to lead them in this field. Overall, most asset 
managers indicated that some asset owners were leading and others following their BNC-initiatives. 
10% indicated that in recent years it were asset owners that actually led the developments. Likewise, 
10% indicated their asset owners were actually following. 
Figure 13 Are asset owners leading or following the asset managers and fund managers in ESG 
integration? 
 
 
Box 5 Division of tasks between asset owner and asset manager 
An asset owner may choose to outsource asset management and engagement activities to asset 
managers. The interviewed investors were asked whether outsourcing such activities must be 
considered as a strength or a weakness of the asset owner.  75% of the respondents argued that 
outsourcing by an asset owner must be seen as a strength. The rationale behind their point of view is 
that by concentrating on core tasks, specialisation may lead asset managers to perform tasks more 
efficient and effective than asset owners. None of the respondents deemed outsourcing a weakness. 
Another driver for taking BNC into account mentioned by the interviewees is the regulatory push. For 
this reference was made to the recently amended IORP (Institutions for Occupational Retirement 
Provision, EU pension regulation) which demands transparency on ESG risks, the French energy law 
whose Article 173 demands transparency on climate and energy transition risks, the Financial 
Stability Board’s Taskforce on Climate related Financial Disclosures (TCFD 2016), and the 
investigation of the Dutch central bank into the financial risks of the energy transition and climate 
change and on responsible investments of Dutch pension funds.  
80% 
10% 
10% 
Differs per owner
Leading
Following
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The growing academic literature on the financial materiality of ESG/BNC factors helps convincing 
financial analysts and portfolio managers of the need to take these systematically into account. Just 
like BNC-related scandals with a huge financial impact that have occurred over recent years, like with 
companies as BP and VW.  
5.2.2 What BNC themes are taken into account? 
Whereas all respondents do take BNC into account to some degree, when asked whether the term 
natural capital resonates within the investor’s organisation. Respondents indicated that terms such 
as BNC are difficult to define and mostly considered too fuzzy to operationalise. Rather, respondents 
translate BNC into concrete components such as water or climate. 
All respondents stated that carbon is seen as by far the most material BNC-aspect and thus receives 
most attention. Water follows at quite a distance, followed by land. Chemicals is hardly a theme that 
makes the short list of themes to work on, or only with very specific companies in agriculture or the 
chemical sector. Some respondents indicated that they thought the materiality of non-carbon 
themes is underestimated and that there may be too much focus on carbon. 
From the interviews it becomes clear that carbon is seen as material to most sectors and that 
agriculture and food and beverages are seen as relevant to most different BNC themes.  
Whereas chemicals as a general theme may receive relatively little attention, it is a central theme in 
some of the highest profile engagement trajectories in recent years with regard to pesticides that are 
harmful to BNC (Syngenta, Monsanto and/or Bayer with ACTIAM, BlackRock and/or Robeco). 
Between the respondents there were little differences as to what BNC themes were seen as most 
material in which sectors. However, some themes (like chemicals for textile) were seen as emerging 
by one or two respondents. 
5.2.3 How asset managers take material BNC themes into account  
In this section, we describe the way that asset managers take BNC into account along the steps of the 
risk framework as specified by the University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership 
(CISL). The CISL describes the following steps to be taken: identification of a specific risk, measuring 
the exposure of the portfolio to that risk, assessment of this risk and the mitigation strategy to 
handle this risk in an adequate way.   
Figure 14 Elements of CISL risk framework 
 
  46 
Source: CISL (2016) 
As we have seen before, many investors identify BNC as a material risk factor, albeit to a differing 
degree. We therefore here discuss the BNC risk exposure, risk assessment and mitigation strategy.  
5.2.3.1 BNC risk exposure 
Exposure to risks is best measured with regard to the most prioritised theme of carbon. However, it 
is not wholly clear how the causality here lies. It may be that carbon is also seen as most material 
because the data on carbon exposure of its companies are most available (the ‘availability bias’). 
Reporting on carbon exposure has been a frontrunner, as in this field a common methodology was 
established first (GHG-protocol in 2001) and an investor-supported initiative started to demand 
reporting (CDP).  
However, despite it being the most widely and best reported BNC theme, respondents indicated that 
also around carbon many question marks remain about their real exposure. Especially with regard to 
scope 3 emissions (elsewhere in the supply chain, with suppliers and customers), which may be the 
most relevant part. 
With regard to water and land, the availability of data is considered to be even more of a problem. 
Despite efforts like CDP Water and CDP Forest, the GRI and ESG-data providers collect data on water 
and land as well. An extra problem is that the relevance of data about water and land use and 
pollution are highly dependent on the specific local situation. Satellite images are sometimes used to 
gather data on the status and impacts of mining on land. However, to link data and impacts to 
specific companies is often a problem as data on the location of production facilities and ownership 
of land is not available.   
Most respondents use several ESG data providers, with MSCI and Sustainalytics being used most 
broadly as the main data providers. A specialised data provider as South Pole was mentioned by two 
respondents as provider of more enriched data on carbon and water. Based on such data, investors 
can estimate the exposure for companies for which no or incomplete data is available by using 
proxies. 
Almost all respondents use ESG-scores from data providers and complement their analysis with their 
own analysis, in particular for outliers. For those analyses, annual reports and other public sources 
are used as well as engagement and regular financial analyst calls. 
Whereas a lack of standardised, trustworthy and complete data is considered an overall problem 
respondents differ in their reaction to this problem. All respondents say that they support investors’ 
calls for more transparency, like from the CDP or UNPRI. However, some also feel that they cannot 
really push too hard on this, as they see a lack of common methodologies/standards for reporting. 
Others stress that this lack of reporting methodologies/standards may be true, but that the only way 
to overcome this issue is to push for meaningful reporting, thus stimulating the uptake of common 
reporting methodologies/standards. 
5.2.3.2 BNC risk assessment 
Whereas some respondents report that BNC, especially carbon, is increasingly taken into account in 
the valuation of companies, the integration of BNC risks remains difficult. Sometimes quantitative 
estimates can be made for the financial impact, but those calculations are often highly uncertain. 
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Most respondents try to integrate ESG analysis and financial analysis. In an integrated approach, BNC 
over-/underperformance is translated into a plus or minus in the valuation. An interesting 
development is that two major data-driven respondents are developing specific quant models that 
incorporate ESG data (Robeco, BlackRock). 
5.2.3.1 Quantitative targets and mitigation strategies 
Despite the fact that both the measurement of risk exposure and the assessment of this risk are 
partial at best, BNC does have a material impact on investment decisions. Thus, the lack of data is no 
barrier for developing mitigation strategies, although ideally the mitigation strategy follows from the 
risk assessment.  
Figure 15 shows how many respondents have set such quantifiable goals with regard to BNC. The 
respondents that have set quantitative targets have specified targets for CO2. A total of 62% of the 
respondents have set up quantified goals with regard to CO2. 38% has not set up any quantified 
goals.  
Figure 15 Established quantified CO2 goals 
 
The fact that there is no clear exposure and agreed upon method for risk assessment also translates 
into quite different mitigation strategies. ACTIAM has set its goal for reducing the carbon exposure of 
its portfolio at 25% in 2025.52 Calculations of BlackRock show that within a broad index this reduction 
of exposure can be achieved with a minimal tracking error of 40 basis points. However, most asset 
managers have set themselves a longer period for this reduction in order to achieve this not only 
through exclusion of the heaviest carbon emitters, but rather/also through engaging with the 
companies in order to improve their performance.  
Whereas the quantitative goals focus on carbon exposure, several respondents stressed that this is 
only a proxy for the actual risk and return. Better risk assessment should allow for more precise and 
meaningful mitigation strategies.  
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 ABP and PFZW were not included in the interviews, but also set quantitative goals. ABP has stated it wants to 
achieve 25% CO2 reduction in 2020 and PFZW aims at a reduction of 50% in 2020. 
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5.2.3.2 Engagement 
Incidentally, active engagement on BNC themes is the primary focus of a respondent. For these 
respondents, engagement is regarded as an important mechanism to improve the BNC performance 
of investee companies. For other respondents, BNC is not a primary focus. However, BNC is 
oftentimes still considered as part and parcel of the investor’s engagement strategy. For respondents 
that do not consider BNC as their primary focus, engagement on BNC themes ranges from 6% 
(BlackRock) to 30% (BMO) of the total engagement activities.53 
Engagement follows a general pattern, also known as the escalation hierarchy (escalatieladder). At 
the bottom level of the hierarchy, an investor commences engagement with a letter addressed to the 
investee company. This letter may be followed by (formal) dialogues with the company. If dialogues 
do not lead to the intended result, investors will issue shareholder resolutions. At the highest level of 
the hierarchy, if all other measures fail, investors may opt for exclusion. Exclusion is an ultimum 
remedium and is mostly used as a pressure factor, only to be effectuated when a company refuses to 
cooperate or does not show any improvement. Exclusion is not the preferred approach if an investor 
still wants to exert influence, but may be an appropriate avenue if an investor wants to prevent any 
involvement in future controversies. 
In the absence of quick fixes, engagement may take several years from starting a dialogue to seeing 
first instances of actual change evidenced. Some respondents define the maximum duration of an 
engagement effort, within which timeframe changed behaviour of the investee company is expected. 
Engagement periods mentioned were two years and three years. Engagement takes time. Therefore, 
some respondents indicate that perseverance is an essential element of successful engagement.  
The total number of engagements (so not only on BNC) realised ranges across the different 
respondents from 70 (MN) to 768 (BMO) per year. Engagement may target specific sectors or may be 
executed independent of the sector. Sometimes engagements were also structured as a concerted 
effort of investors through platforms such as UNPRI, Eumedion and GES (SPF Beheer, NNIP, ACTIAM). 
These collaborations were successful in certain instances. Successful results were for example 
achieved with regard to sustainable palm oil (BMO), High Conservation Value Forests (Robeco) and 
fracking (Triodos IM). Engagement may also be geared towards specific themes, such as CO2, or to 
increased reporting, such as reporting to CDP and water. Some respondents are reluctant to attribute 
success to their engagement efforts, because causality between engagement efforts and the results 
achieved may be difficult to establish. As a result, these respondents proceed with caution when 
claiming successes. 
5.3 Outcome and analysis of interviews with companies 
5.3.1 Influence of companies’ BNC performance and reporting  
When asked whether the terms BNC resonate within the company, almost all of the companies 
(except one) indicated that this is not the case. Respondents indicated that terms such as BNC are 
too general and thereby difficult to define. Rather, the companies try to make this theme more 
                                                             
53 BNC engagement efforts as a percentage of total engagements other investors: 23% (PGGM), 20% (NNIP). 
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concrete by operationalizing it into more specific issues, such as water, climate, or land use. Natural 
capital as separate topic does not seem to count yet.  
It seems to the interviewees that investors are only interested in BNC when there is a clear and direct 
link to (reduced) financial risks. The companies do not have the idea that their BNC performance has 
any material influence on investors. Similarly, when focussing specifically on reporting and 
transparency none of the companies has the idea that their transparency strategy influences their 
investors. Sustainability performance in general does have an influence. It helps companies to get 
included in specific sustainability funds. 
5.3.2 Investors engagement approach  
All companies confirm that investors do have an active engagement approach. However, existing 
investors’ engagement approaches focus mainly on financial performance. Specific engagement 
strategies focussing on BNC or even sustainability performance as such seems to be non-existent. If 
companies are questioned about sustainability issues it is always in relation to financial risks or 
opportunities. 
One exception is the VBDO. The VBDO is always present at the Annual General Meeting of 
Shareholders (AGM) to ask questions related to sustainability themes. Companies are positive about 
their presence and consistency. Their presence makes it easier for the companies to get the 
sustainability topics internally ‘on the agenda’. BNC has been on the agenda of the VBDO and 
specifically the themes biodiversity, climate and water. However, the companies also emphasised 
that the VBDO sometimes asks too general and easy to answer questions. Finally, the VBDO is not 
always seen as the spokesman for institutional investors. This is mainly because the members of the 
VBDO only enclose relatively few institutional investors. 
5.3.3 The main information sources for investors related to BNC  
Investors have a relative limited focus on BNC according to the interviewed companies. If investors 
collect or use information on BNC for their investment decisions, these data are mainly obtained 
from third parties. In addition, sustainability or integrated reports and data from websites are 
sometimes used.    
5.3.4 The role of institutional investors in companies’ BNC performance  
We discussed with the companies whether (institutional) investors could help companies to perform 
better in the field of BNC. The companies all confirmed that there is a role to play for institutional 
investors. The companies argued however that investors could better ask for more information on 
the process, the planning and quantitative targets set for BNC, mostly in regard to CO2 emissions. 
Next to that, investors could ask for sustainability performance directly, instead of only indirectly by 
relating it to (financial) risks. In this way, the company realises the importance of BNC for the 
investors. Companies said to regret that investors mainly focus on negative impact while they do not 
seem to value positive impacts. Like contributing to biodiversity or having a negative impact on 
greenhouse gases. 
Two companies argued that it would be very welcome if investors would also use other engagement 
strategies, such as ‘firelight sessions’ (i.e. sessions with the board of directors or management 
board). It would also be appreciated if investors or spokesmen of investors, e.g. VBDO, could provide 
more information, present and discuss trends, future expectations and international best practices. 
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5.3.5 Adaptation of company BNC strategy and measurement if requested  
Companies said they would be willing to adapt their BNC strategies if that would be requested by 
investors during engagement. However, in reality there are not a lot of requests by investors related 
to BNC in general.  
Nevertheless, one company explained that they increased their quantitative targets to reduce 
negative BNC impacts based upon a discussion with the VBDO during the AGM. This shows that these 
kinds of discussions do have an impact on a company’s strategy, ambitions and therefore 
performance in the long run. 
We also discussed whether companies would be open to change their measurement methods, 
valuation methods or reporting format if institutional investors would request this (either for 
benchmarking or for absolute valuation). In general, the companies seem to be reluctant to adapt 
new measurement methods, valuation methods or reporting formats as such. Especially if all 
investors would ask for different measurement schemes, companies would be loaded with extra 
work. Furthermore, the companies made clear that the questionnaires of rating agencies (like 
Sustainalytics or RobecoSAM) sometimes already ask for specific calculations and/or indicators. From 
this point of view, companies would welcome standard measurement and reporting methods. 
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6. Conclusions, recommendations and further research 
In this chapter, we present the conclusions of our research. Our answers to the research questions 
are based on the literature study and our interviews. On the basis of these results, we formulate 
several policy recommendations for the government that may enable asset managers and fund 
managers to better engage with companies, in order to improve their BNC performance and thereby 
contribute to public goals as well as address financial risks and opportunities in this field. 
6.1 Conclusions 
6.1.1 With regard to the asset managers and fund managers 
1. To what extent and how is information on land use, water use, chemical pollution and carbon 
emissions presently used in investment decisions and engagement with investee companies? 
Is BNC assessment already a special area of interest, related to the risk assessment?  
The interviews found that BNC is not a special area of interest in itself, since terms such as BNC are 
too general. However, both the interviews and the literature study found that the underlying themes 
are increasingly being taken into account when designing investment policies and in the financial 
analysis of companies. The business case for BNC is clearly “on the rise”, even though the term itself 
is not commonly used. 
However, this does not yet imply that BNC is fully integrated in financial analyses and risk 
management. Where the materiality of BNC is increasingly acknowledged, and the materiality of 
carbon is acknowledged by all investors we interviewed, the step to actually measure the potential 
impact on financial results and risks remains a challenge. Both the literature and the interviews 
showed that a (quantified and complete) risk assessment based on potential impacts and 
dependencies on BNC is seldom made. However, we do see that asset owners and managers 
increasingly take mitigating measures, like setting quantitative goals for the reduction of their 
exposure to carbon emissions.  
2. What BNC aspects are regarded to be most essential for investment decisions? Or is BNC 
information used on aggregate levels only, based on general ESG ratings and benchmarks? 
The interviews confirmed the findings from the literature that, in particular, carbon is seen as a 
material factor for many companies and sectors. This is increasingly, but to a lesser extent, also the 
case for water, land and (much less so) chemicals.  
The interviewed investors use specific data on carbon, water, land and chemicals from the ESG-data 
providers, supplemented with their own research and findings from engagement with the investee 
companies.  
Looking at the ‘materiality matrix’ of BNC themes and sectors that we distilled from the interviews, 
we see that all themes, i.e. carbon, water, land and chemicals, are relevant for agriculture. The 
literature showed that agriculture is also the sector with the highest costs, and thereby risk, related 
to externalities as a percentage of its profits. Carbon is an issue in almost all sectors. 
The interviews showed that general ESG ratings are increasingly used. However, when companies are 
outliers on one of these aspects (i.e. performing much more negative or positive than their peers) 
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investors may develop their own analysis. Such an analysis can include data from public sources 
(annual reports), proprietary databases and engagement.  
At some of the investors interviewed, engagement is no longer the exclusive domain of engagement 
specialists and/or the responsible investing department. Since ESG factors are more and more 
included in the regular financial analysis, also financial analysts may ask questions about ESG factors, 
including BNC, during regular meetings and analyst calls. According to some of the interviewees from 
the investor side this may even be a more powerful form of engagement than the traditional one. 
However, about this engagement on BNC-issues by financial analysts only anecdotal information is 
available, it is not part of the public reporting on engagement of asset managers and fund managers.  
This integration of BNC in the financial analysis strengthens the financial feedback loop. As 
companies currently know that being an outlier may translate in exclusion from the investment 
universe, or inclusion in specific impact funds, the internal ESG-stakeholders can now, as a next step, 
also point out that less dramatic deviations from the benchmark in the field of BNC will influence the 
valuation of a company and thus have a real financial impact.  
3. How do asset managers and fund managers decide on applying a certain action in the event a 
company’s activities negatively impact BNC (e.g. exclusion of worst offenders, inclusion of 
frontrunners, and/or engagement with companies and funds)?  
Our interviewees applied all the motivations from the literature to take BNC into account and engage 
on it: idealistic motives, regulatory changes, financial reasons, aiming to increase transparency, raise 
social and environmental standards. The financial motivation seems to particularly weigh more 
heavily over recent years due to the increasing evidence of the materiality on BNC both in empirical 
literature as in recent high profile cases, such as BP and Volkswagen.  
The interviews found that by using engagement, asset managers and fund managers combine formal 
shareholder rights with more informal forms of communication. 
As found in the literature, the engaged companies generally have reputational concerns and a higher 
capacity to implement changes. The interviews added that market leading or ‘iconic’-companies, 
which can set the standard in the sector, are specifically targeted by investors. 
During the interviews, the investors stressed the importance of collaboration in engagement and the 
fact that an engagement often takes a long time to become effective and lead to actual change in 
performance (2-3 years). 
The existing literature mainly describes the form of engagement approaches and activities. 
Information on the actual results of engagement is very limited. We provide information of this as 
reported by investors themselves. We found that mostly the targets set for engagement are 
achieved. However, attribution of the success of engagement is difficult as many external aspects 
influence the engaged companies, the investors often being only one of many stakeholders engaging 
with the company on a specific topic. Investors are also quite optimistic about the success of 
engagement in the field of BNC, as BNC issues simply make a strong business case and hence 
companies are eager to grasp the opportunities better performance in this field offer. 
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4. If BNC information is not used for investment decisions: why not, and what has to change so 
that this information will be taken into account? Do the various voluntary and mandatory 
reporting formats provide all of the required information in respect of a company’s BNC 
impacts and dependencies?  
Both the literature and the interviews show that the main impediment to using BNC-related data is 
the lack of reliable and comparable data. Whereas there is still much to be gained if more companies 
would adopt current reporting formats (integrated reporting, GRI and others) many gaps remain as 
well in the existing methodologies that prohibit a full assessment of BNC-related impacts and 
dependencies. The perceived lack of standards and alignment between existing standards also for 
reporting on important carbon emissions (scope 3), makes it hard for investors to fully take these 
factors into account.  
It is for this reason that much of the engagement focuses on increasing transparency of BNC 
performance. However, some investors stressed that sometimes there also is a lack of commonly 
accepted methodologies to measure BNC outputs, outcomes and specifically impacts. In those cases, 
like carbon scope 3, they therefore do not push their investee companies. 
Lastly, particularly for land and water, much data are available through satellites that could be linked 
to specific production locations of companies. However, except for the mining companies, most 
companies do not (fully) disclose the location of their fields and factories.    
6.1.2 With regard to the companies 
5. Is interaction with asset managers and fund managers an important motivation for 
companies to change their reporting on BNC impacts and dependencies?  
This is not the case for the companies we interviewed, which may be explained by them being 
relative frontrunners in this field. From the literature and the interviews of the investors it became 
clear that a large part of the engagement in the field of BNC is actually aimed at motivating 
companies to improve their reporting on BNC. As the companies interviewed complain about the 
burden of different reporting demands from different ESG data providers, they signal that without 
this they might not have reported in such a specific way. Although the question that remains is 
whether the different reporting formats that data providers send to companies actually increases the 
transparency of their BNC performance in a meaningful way 
6. Is interaction with asset managers and fund managers an important motivation for 
companies to change their performance of BNC impacts and dependencies? 
Interviews with companies showed that discussions with investors do have an impact on a company’s 
strategy, ambitions and thereby performance in the long run. Engagement makes it easier for 
internal supporters of BNC to put this issue on the agenda and/or helps them to get their agenda 
implemented in practice. This finding is in line with the expectations based on the ToC. 
However, the companies interviewed do not have the idea that their BNC performance has the 
interest of investors. Also, specific engagement strategies focussing on BNC or even sustainability 
performance as such appear to be non-existent. If companies are questioned about sustainability 
issues it is always in relation to direct financial risks or opportunities (will this lead to better/worse 
financial performance?). When there is an engagement in the field of BNC, the focus is mostly on the 
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negative impact while they do not seem to value positive impacts that companies themselves also 
focus and report on. The exception being VBDO that does address BNC in a structured way, and in a 
wider and more positive context. However, VBDO is not always seen as the spokesman for 
institutional investors. 
7. What are the expected effects on company reporting and performance of the different types 
of interventions by investors and fund managers? 
Exclusion is not an issue with the companies interviewed as they do not belong to the companies 
that are negative outliers on material issues. Rather, they are companies that are or could be 
included in positive ESG funds. Being included on the basis of positive BNC performance is something 
that is valued by the company, even though it does not have a material impact on the finance of a 
company.  
The integration of BNC in financial analysis is not something that consciously affects the interviewed 
companies. The companies are not aware of any impact on the availability of finance. However, the 
investors stated and the literature showed that companies increasingly do integrate BNC in their 
financial analysis with a material impact on the valuations made. 
This apparent contradiction can be explained by: 
a. BNC being a recent and not yet very strong developed issue on the investors side (still only 
‘weak signals’); 
b. The use of BNC data being done mostly in the ‘back office’ of the investors: the financial 
analysis that now includes BNC data as one of the many (around 100) factors being taken 
into account in valuing a company’s stock; and 
c. BNC being a new channel of interaction in the purely financial domain that does not 
necessarily reach the people in the company that work on sustainability, so that it can have a 
financial impact but one that the companies sustainability people are not aware of. 
As concluded before from the literature and confirmed in the interviews, the direct result of 
engagement is mainly a power shift within the company away from some managers towards others 
with the support of the shareholders. This leads to changes in the orientations and attitudes of 
organisational members. 
What can be done better according to the companies, as suggested in the interviews, is that 
investors could ask for more information on the process, the planning and quantitative targets set for 
BNC. Investors could ask for sustainability performance directly, instead of only indirectly by relating 
it to (financial) risks. A more productive form of engagement may be so called ‘firelight sessions’ (i.e. 
sessions with the board of directors or management board) about a company’s strategy and 
ambitions. It would also be appreciated if investors or spokesmen of investors, e.g. VBDO, could 
provide more information, present and discuss trends, future expectations and international best 
practices to companies.  
The interviewed companies would also welcome standard measurement and reporting methods as 
they currently have to spend much time responding to questionnaires that often ask for similar 
information, while each questionnaire requires its own specific indicators for filling it in. This 
burdensome way of collecting BNC data may also lead to a wrong view of especially smaller 
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companies, as they do not have specific persons employed for filling in questionnaires. Their 
performance therefore may be better, but may look poorer. 
6.2 Policy recommendations 
So how can public policy makers enable asset and fund managers to induce their investee companies 
to improve their BNC performance? In particular, how can the EU Directive 2014/95 on mandatory 
non-financial reporting be helpful for the specific needs of asset managers and fund managers? What 
supporting policies in BNC reporting by companies can be advised to make the EU Directive 2014/95 
in the Netherlands more effective in reducing negative corporate BNC impacts?   
The frontrunner companies and investors we interviewed did not have very high expectations of the 
changes that will be realised by the EU directive. Although it was stressed that it will be helpful in 
levelling the playing field by improving the reporting of laggards.  
Investors stressed in particular the need for reliable and comparable data. For this standardisation is 
needed in the methodologies used to report the BNC impacts and dependencies. The EU Directive 
could play a role here by being more descriptive of the use of existing reporting formats like the 
Integrated Reporting Framework and the Guidelines on Responsible Investing. 
Several recommendations for supporting policies have been found in the literature and have been 
provided by the interviewees. The recommendations can be clustered into two issues, each 
comprising several possible policy interventions: 
1. Standardisation of BNC reporting methodologies; 
2. Incentives to use BNC data in financial analysis. 
These are not two wholly separate clusters. Better available standardised BNC data will be in itself an 
incentive for financial institutions to use these data. And when financial institutions are incentivised 
to take BNC into account they will need, and thus push for, more reporting thus increasing the 
availability of standardised BNC reporting and reporting methodologies. 
6.2.1 Standardisation of BNC reporting methodologies  
In reporting on BNC there is the need to find the right balance between stimulating reporting along 
common standards (standardisation) and leaving room for different approaches as the relevant BNC 
impacts and dependencies are different between companies and sectors.  
Require standardised reporting  
Where methodologies are well enough developed, a requirement to report following those 
methodologies will stimulate the use of these data by investors. The EU Directive can be used for this 
by making more explicit reference to such standards, like the Integrated Reporting Framework and 
the GRI. A specific reporting requirement could refer to the geographical location of production sites. 
Such requirement may supplement available satellite data and may for instance help to establish the 
exact water use of production sites and possible land degradation issues in their vicinity. 
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Stimulate experimentation and methodological development 
However, one must be careful not to disrupt what is in essence a creative process. Where 
methodologies are not that well developed, it is better to start with a principle-based framework, 
celebrate best practices and start monitoring. Thus, a learning process is put in place. 
In many fields of BNC, like carbon scope 3, the methodologies available still lack a commonly felt 
trustworthiness. Here, further development is required. Further development is also needed, when it 
comes to the development of scenarios and transition pathways against which financial portfolios 
can be stress tested and benchmarked. 
Governments can continue their role as funder for efforts to develop methodologies and stimulate 
their uptake, as they have done together with foundations for instance in the field of the Natural 
Capital Protocol. This ethical and public funding source also helps to make this collaboration as open 
as possible, to all parties from the financial institutions as well as to knowledge institutions and 
NGOs. In order to diffuse this knowledge it should find its way to education, particularly that of 
accountants and finance professionals.  
Standardise the data gathering process 
Standardisation of BNC reporting formats will also help by lowering the costs of data gathering on 
the side of companies. Currently, every rating agency has their own detailed questionnaire, where a 
more standardised data gathering process not only lowers costs, but also makes it possible to make 
data more openly available, thereby further reducing the costs.  
6.2.2 Incentives for asset managers and fund managers to use BNC data in financial 
analysis 
Ethical considerations aside, BNC matters to financial institutions in as far as it (potentially) translates 
into financial risks and opportunities. Increasing the availability of reliable and comparable data will 
help the financial sector to judge whether and how BNC impacts and dependencies can have 
financial effects.  
There are however other ways through which governments can contribute to raising the awareness 
of the financial sector of the financial effects of BNC impacts and dependencies, and hence stimulate 
financial institutions to act upon this by engaging with their investee companies to improve their 
performance. 
Public policies to protect BNC 
Firstly, governments themselves play an important role in translating BNC impact and dependencies 
into financial costs and benefits through for instance their regulation and taxation. Public policy 
makers can make the financial sector receptive for BNC accounting and reporting through signalling 
that they (will) maintain credible policies to protect BNC. Governments can also increase the number 
of investable projects with a positive BNC impact, for instance through public co-investments, 
procurement and stimulating the green bond market. 
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Strengthen the evidence base of the materiality of BNC 
Another way to increase the perceived benefit for financial institutions of BNC accounting and 
reporting is through building the evidence base on the materiality of BNC for financial institutions. 
Much research has been done on the financial risk and return of ESG performance. However, 
specifically on BNC more research could help to increase the insight in the financial materiality of the 
issue. For instance, scenarios could be developed similar to the carbon bubble, that start from the 
assumption that internationally agreed goals with regard to BNC preservation (biodiversity, water 
etc) will be met, that show how this can be done and how this will impact specific sectors, 
geographical locations, companies and asset classes. 
Supervision of BNC risks  
Also supervisors and regulators, like the Dutch Central Bank and Financial Markets Authority,  are an 
important influence. They see to it that financial institutions have a proper assessment of all material 
risks. Hence, also the ones originating from BNC impact and dependencies. Increasingly, supervisors 
are looking at carbon (BoE 2015, DNB 2016) and in emerging markets also to other themes (UNEP 
Inquiry 2015). When these practices become more widespread financial institutions are incentivised 
to pay closer attention to this.  
Stimulate long-term investing 
Lastly, there is the wider issue of financial reform to focus the financial sector more on the real 
economy (SFL 2011) and the long term (Barton and Wiseman 2014, Bloomberg 2016) as this will 
make it more aware of BNC impacts and dependencies as these will only have a financial impact in 
the medium to long term.  
Several proposals have been brought forward to make banks and asset managers more forward-
looking and more conducive to ecological issues (van Tilburg, 2009, Kay 2012, FCLT 2015, van Tilburg 
et al 2016, CISL 2016, Dijkstra 2016) such as performance criteria and fees with a long-term 
perspective for asset managers, quarterly reporting by asset managers instead of the current daily, 
weekly or monthly reporting and paying more attention to qualitative information (strategy of the 
organisation, goals set, processes) and their BNC performance.  
6.3 Questions for further research  
In this paper we have been able to identify, based on a sample of asset managers, how the EU 
Directive on non-financial reporting can be a more effective instrument in reaching public goals in 
the field of BNC. We also presented other possible ways for governments to stimulate financial 
institutions to pay attention to the BNC performance of their investee companies and engage with 
them to improve it. 
An important question for governments relates to the BNC fields in which the methodologies for 
reporting are sufficiently developed to warrant a requirement to use these methodologies. Much 
work has been undertaken in recent years to further develop reporting methodologies. However, a 
clear and widely shared view amongst investors and companies on the current status seems to lack. 
The interests of investors and companies here also seem to diverge, with investors looking for 
comparable data and companies primarily using BNC measurement as a way to improve their 
strategy. Further research can identify those areas where investors and companies agree that 
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reporting can be done in a reliable and comparable way and where both, or one of these groups, 
thinks this is not the case and what major methodological questions still remain. 
This research has looked at asset managers and fund managers. Thereby also asking questions about 
the asset owners, being institutions like insurance companies and pension fund and retail investors. 
However, the use of BNC data in banks has not been looked at. This can be a major omission as banks 
are globally, and especially in Europe, still the largest financier. However, much of this credit is rather 
short term whereas the issue of BNC is probably more related to the long term and risk bearing 
investments that are mostly the domain of asset managers. Still, it would be interesting to see how 
banks take BNC into account in their lending practices. 
The sample of asset managers, fund managers and companies has been small. It would be interesting 
to interview more investors and companies, especially in other European countries. 
Another valuable addition would be to collect more quantitative data on specifically the investors. 
Much data are available through the PRI transparency reports but additional questions can be asked 
in the field of BNC and the strategy of engagement. 
Another source of data is the own engagement databases of asset managers. Here the BNC related 
engagements could be isolated and their effect researched.  
Finally, the interviews with investors focused on the use of BNC in valuing the shares of companies. 
Other asset classes are also relevant for BNC, like the direct investments in land (PBL 2016). 
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Glossary  
 
Asset manager 
Financial institution managing the funds of asset owners. 
Biodiversity 
Biodiversity entails the total variety of living organisms, within species and between species. 
Engagement 
When an investor exerts its shareholder rights to influence an investee company’s management 
decision-making, this is called engagement. Engagement can take on various forms, such as sending 
letters, proposing shareholder resolutions and informal conversations. 
EU Directive 2014/95 
In October 2014, the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament adopted Directive 
2014/95/EU.  This Directive introduced new provisions with regard to corporate disclosure of non-
financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings and corporate groups. The Directive 
stipulates that certain large undertakings, such as listed companies, banks and insurance companies, 
in excess of an average number of 500 employees shall include a ‘non-financial statement’ in their 
annual report. 
Exclusion 
Exclusion means that an investor decides to disinvest in an existing investee company or not to invest 
in a potential investee company at all. An investor may have an exclusion list of activities that 
warrant exclusion of an investee company involved in such activities (e.g. trade in weapons, 
pornography or involvement in child labour).   
Fiduciary duty 
Fiduciary duty refers to the legal obligation of one party to act in the best interest of another. For 
instance, a pension service provider has an obligation to pension holders that they receive their 
pension money.  
Fund manager 
Financial institution offering funds where asset owners can invest in. 
Integrated reporting 
Integrated reporting takes place when an organisation communicates about how it creates value in 
the short, medium and long term by concisely reporting about its strategy, governance, performance 
and prospects, in the context of its external environment. 
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Natural capital 
Natural capital encompasses all natural assets, such as earth, air, water, flora and fauna, and 
ecosystem goods and services. 
Materiality 
Materiality has different meanings depending on its context. Within the financial sector, a matter is 
material when it substantively affects an organisation’s ability to create value. 
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Abbreviations 
 
AGM    Annual General Meeting of shareholders 
BES    Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services 
BMO    BMO Global Asset Management 
BNC    biodiversity and natural capital 
CDP    Carbon Disclosure Project 
CICES    Common International Classification of Ecosystem Services 
CISL    University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership 
CRR    Chain Reaction Research 
CSP    Corporate Social Performance 
CSR    Corporate Social Responsibility 
DCC    Dutch Civil Code  
EBITDA    Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization 
ESG     Ecological, Social and Governance 
GDP    Gross Domestic Product 
GRI    Global Reporting Initiative 
IFRS    International Financial Reporting Standards 
IORP    Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision 
MEA    Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
NCD    Natural Capital Declaration 
NCP    Natural Capital Protocol 
NNIP    NN Investment Partners 
OECD MNE Guidelines Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
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PBL    Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency 
PRI    Principles for Responsible Investment 
RSPO    Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil 
SASB    Sustainability Accounting Standards Board 
SRI    Socially Responsible investment 
SSE    social shareholder engagement 
TCFD    Taskforce on Climate-related Financial Disclosures 
TEEB    The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity 
ToC    Theory of Change 
Triodos IM   Triodos Investment Management 
UN    United Nations 
UNPRI    UN Principles for Responsible Investment 
US GAAP   U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
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